Annotated Transcript Of Episode 3

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ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT BURNS EPISODE 3 The River Styx (January 1964-December 1965)

Color Coding: Red = False statement; Yellow = Warning; Green = Not yet used; Blue = Interesting, warranting Attention;

Gray = I’ve got to study and verify this item; Pink = Loaded Words?

MINUTES 1-10

1

00:00:01,566 --> 00:00:03,000 ANNOUNCER: MAJOR SUPPORT FOR "THE VIETNAM WAR"

2

00:00:03,000 --> 00:00:06,500 WAS PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF THE BETTER ANGELS SOCIETY,

3

00:00:06,500 --> 00:00:10,466 INCLUDING JONATHAN AND JEANNIE LAVINE,

4

00:00:10,466 --> 00:00:13,366 DIANE AND HAL BRIERLEY,

5

00:00:13,366 --> 00:00:15,766 AMY AND DAVID ABRAMS,

6

00:00:15,766 --> 00:00:18,266 JOHN AND CATHERINE DEBS,

7

00:00:18,266 --> 00:00:21,166 THE FULLERTON FAMILY CHARITABLE FUND,

8

00:00:21,166 --> 00:00:23,233 THE MONTRONE FAMILY,

9

00:00:23,233 --> 00:00:25,566 LYNDA AND STEWART RESNICK,

10

00:00:25,566 --> 00:00:28,333 THE PERRY AND DONNA GOLKIN FAMILY FOUNDATION,

11

00:00:28,333 --> 00:00:29,333 THE LYNCH FOUNDATION,

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00:00:29,333 --> 00:00:32,200 THE ROGER AND ROSEMARY ENRICO FOUNDATION,

13

00:00:32,200 --> 00:00:35,633 AND BY THESE ADDITIONAL FUNDERS.

14

00:00:35,633 --> 00:00:37,533 MAJOR FUNDING WAS ALSO PROVIDED

15

00:00:37,533 --> 00:00:39,266 BY DAVID H. KOCH...

16

00:00:41,566 --> 00:00:43,766 THE BLAVATNIK FAMILY FOUNDATION...

17

00:00:46,100 --> 00:00:48,533 THE PARK FOUNDATION,

18

00:00:48,533 --> 00:00:50,700 THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES,

19

00:00:50,700 --> 00:00:52,900 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,

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00:00:52,900 --> 00:00:55,566 THE JOHN S. AND JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION,

21

00:00:55,566 --> 00:00:58,333 THE ANDREW W. MELLON FOUNDATION,

22

00:00:58,333 --> 00:01:01,000 THE ARTHUR VINING DAVIS FOUNDATIONS,

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00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:03,200 THE FORD FOUNDATION JUSTFILMS,

24

00:01:03,200 --> 00:01:04,400 BY THE CORPORATION

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00:01:04,400 --> 00:01:05,633 FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING,

26

00:01:05,633 --> 00:01:07,600 AND BY VIEWERS LIKE YOU.

27

00:01:07,600 --> 00:01:08,733 THANK YOU.

28

00:01:13,266 --> 00:01:15,400 ANNOUNCER: BANK OF AMERICA PROUDLY SUPPORTS

29

00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:20,300 KEN BURNS' AND LYNN NOVICK'S FILM "THE VIETNAM WAR"

30

00:01:20,300 --> 00:01:22,700 BECAUSE FOSTERING DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

31

00:01:22,700 --> 00:01:25,300 AND CIVIL DISCOURSE AROUND IMPORTANT ISSUES

32

00:01:25,300 --> 00:01:27,600 FURTHERS PROGRESS, EQUALITY,

33

00:01:27,600 --> 00:01:29,600 AND A MORE CONNECTED SOCIETY.

34

00:01:34,066 --> 00:01:38,100 GO TO BANKOFAMERICA.COM/ BETTERCONNECTED TO LEARN MORE.

35

00:01:43,533 --> 00:01:45,866 (birds chirping, dog barking in distance)

36

00:01:48,333 --> 00:01:51,066 ("With God on Our Side" by Bob Dylan playing)

37

00:01:57,833 --> 00:02:01,833 DYLAN: ♪ Oh, my name, it ain't nothin' ♪

38

00:02:01,833 --> 00:02:04,866 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Well, I wanted to name him after his dad,

39

00:02:04,866 --> 00:02:07,100 Denton Winslow Crocker.

40

00:02:07,100 --> 00:02:10,866 So that was the name we chose.

41

00:02:10,866 --> 00:02:13,233 He was a colicky little baby.

42

00:02:13,233 --> 00:02:17,233 And, uh, so we were up night and day with him.

43

00:02:17,233 --> 00:02:20,600 And my husband was a wonderful dad

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00:02:20,600 --> 00:02:22,933 and very loving and attentive.

45

00:02:22,933 --> 00:02:24,900 He'd walk the floor with him.

46

00:02:24,900 --> 00:02:28,800 And then he said one day, "He's a regular little mogul

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00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:31,933 the way he rules our lives."

48

00:02:31,933 --> 00:02:34,233 So that's where the name came from.

49

00:02:34,233 --> 00:02:35,800 We called him Mogie.

50

00:02:35,800 --> 00:02:40,433 NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker was born June 3, 1947,

51

00:02:40,433 --> 00:02:42,900 the oldest of four children.

52

00:02:42,900 --> 00:02:44,833 His father was a biology teacher,

53

00:02:44,833 --> 00:02:48,066 and Mogie was raised in college towns:

54

00:02:48,066 --> 00:02:52,466 Ithaca, Amherst, and finally Saratoga Springs,

55

00:02:52,466 --> 00:02:57,200 to which the family moved in 1960, when he was 13.

56

00:02:57,200 --> 00:03:01,233 CAROL CROCKER: SARATOGA SPRINGS My mother read books to all of us.

57

00:03:01,233 --> 00:03:03,566 My brother was definitely the one

58

00:03:03,566 --> 00:03:06,333 who probably gravitated towards them more than I did.

59

00:03:06,333 --> 00:03:08,533 He really feasted on books.

60

00:03:08,533 --> 00:03:11,366 NARRATOR: Mogie was an unusual boy.

61

00:03:11,366 --> 00:03:14,833 Intelligent, independent-minded, and too nearsighted

62

00:03:14,833 --> 00:03:17,000 to do well at team sports,

63

00:03:17,000 --> 00:03:20,966 he loved books about American history and American heroes.

64

00:03:20,966 --> 00:03:23,466 At 12, he started a diary

65

00:03:23,466 --> 00:03:26,700 in which he kept track of Cold War events.

66

00:03:26,700 --> 00:03:29,066 "I hate Reds!" he wrote,

67

00:03:29,066 --> 00:03:31,833 and he admired most those who had proved willing

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00:03:31,833 --> 00:03:35,766 to sacrifice themselves for a cause.

69

00:03:35,766 --> 00:03:38,766 President John F. Kennedy's call for every American

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00:03:38,766 --> 00:03:42,500 to ask what he or she could do for their country

71

00:03:42,500 --> 00:03:47,166 had mirrored ideas he'd held since he was a small boy.

72

00:03:47,166 --> 00:03:50,300 JEANE-MARIE CROCKER One evening when I was reading to Denton

73

00:03:50,300 --> 00:03:56,133 before he went to sleep, I chose a passage fromHenry V,

74

00:03:56,133 --> 00:04:01,566 which is, "He today that sheds his blood with me

75

00:04:01,566 --> 00:04:03,800 "shall be my brother.

76

00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:08,733 "And gentlemen in England now a-bed

77

00:04:08,733 --> 00:04:11,333 "shall think themselves accurs'd

78

00:04:11,333 --> 00:04:15,566 "they were not here and hold their manhood cheap

79

00:04:15,566 --> 00:04:20,566 while any speaks that fought with us upon St. Crispin's Day."

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00:04:20,566 --> 00:04:21,866 (distant bombs echoing)

81

00:04:21,866 --> 00:04:25,433 DYLAN: ♪ If another war comes...

82

00:04:25,433 --> 00:04:27,866 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: I think that it was that sort of thing

83

00:04:27,866 --> 00:04:29,833 that made Denton want to be

84

00:04:29,833 --> 00:04:35,466 part of something important and brave.

85

00:04:35,466 --> 00:04:38,566 DYLAN: ♪ With God on their side.

86

00:04:38,566 --> 00:04:43,100 ("With God on Our Side" continues) THE VIETNAM WAR

87

00:04:51,533 --> 00:04:54,200 LYNDON JOHNSON: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES I just stayed awake last night thinking about this thing.

88

00:04:54,200 --> 00:04:57,933 The more I think of it, I don't know what in the hell...

89

00:04:57,933 --> 00:05:00,333 it looks like to me we're getting into another Korea.

90

00:05:00,333 --> 00:05:02,200 It just worries the hell out of me.

91

00:05:02,200 --> 00:05:04,866 I don't see what we can ever hope to get out of there with

92

00:05:04,866 --> 00:05:06,133 once we're committed.

93

00:05:06,133 --> 00:05:08,266 I don't think it's worth fighting for

94

00:05:08,266 --> 00:05:09,800 and I don't think we can get out.

95

00:05:09,800 --> 00:05:11,466 And it's just the biggest damn mess I ever saw.

96

00:05:11,466 --> 00:05:13,100 McGEORGE BUNDY: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR It is, it's an awful mess.

97

00:05:13,100 --> 00:05:16,033 JOHNSON: I just thought about ordering those kids in there,

98

00:05:16,033 --> 00:05:17,766 and what in the hell am I ordering them out there for?

99

00:05:17,766 --> 00:05:19,233 BUNDY: One thing that has occurred to me...

100

00:05:19,233 --> 00:05:20,733 JOHNSON: What the hell is Vietnam worth to me?

101

00:05:20,733 --> 00:05:22,533 What is it worth to this country?

102

00:05:22,533 --> 00:05:24,000 BUNDY: Yeah, yeah.

103

00:05:24,000 --> 00:05:26,233 JOHNSON: Now, of course, if you start running [1] the communists,

104

00:05:26,233 --> 00:05:28,233 they may just chase you right into your own kitchen.

105

00:05:28,233 --> 00:05:30,966 BUNDY: Yeah. That's the trouble.

106

00:05:30,966 --> 00:05:33,933 And that is what the rest of that half of the world

107

00:05:33,933 --> 00:05:37,466 is going to think if this thing comes apart on us.

108

00:05:37,466 --> 00:05:39,000 LYNDON JOHNSON: It's damned easy to get in a war,

109

00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:40,666 but it's going to be awfully hard to ever extricate yourself

110

00:05:40,666 --> 00:05:41,800 if you get in. EPISODE THREE THE RIVER STYX JANUARY 1964-DECEMBER 1965

111

00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:43,366 BUNDY: It's very easy...

112

00:05:43,366 --> 00:05:44,800 JOHNSON: I'd like to hear Walter and McNamara to evaluate this thing.

113

00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:45,833 BUNDY: To debate it?

114

00:05:45,833 --> 00:05:47,200 JOHNSON: Yeah.

115

00:05:47,200 --> 00:05:48,866 BUNDY: All right, what's a possible time...?

116

00:05:50,600 --> 00:05:53,700 NARRATOR: Tragedy had brought Lyndon Johnson to the presidency

117

00:05:53,700 --> 00:05:56,933 in November of 1963.

118

00:05:56,933 --> 00:05:59,700 And he would not feel himself fully in charge

119

00:05:59,700 --> 00:06:03,800 until he had faced the voters the following year.

120

00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:07,266 But his ambitions for his country were as great

121

00:06:07,266 --> 00:06:10,666 as those of his hero, Franklin Roosevelt.

122

00:06:10,666 --> 00:06:12,733 During his years in the White House,

123

00:06:12,733 --> 00:06:15,033 he would lead the struggle to win passage

124

00:06:15,033 --> 00:06:19,200 of more than 200 important pieces of legislation--

125

00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:24,833 the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

126

00:06:24,833 --> 00:06:29,300 federal aid to education, Head Start, Medicare,

127

00:06:29,300 --> 00:06:32,600 and a whole series of bills aimed at ending poverty

128

00:06:32,600 --> 00:06:35,733 in America, all intended to create

129

00:06:35,733 --> 00:06:38,666 what he called "The Great Society."

130

00:06:38,666 --> 00:06:43,366 In foreign affairs, Johnson was less self-assured.

131

00:06:43,366 --> 00:06:45,633 "Foreigners are not like the folks I'm used to,"

132

00:06:45,633 --> 00:06:47,333 he once said.

133

00:06:47,333 --> 00:06:50,033 To deal with them, he retained in office

134

00:06:50,033 --> 00:06:52,833 all of John Kennedy's top advisors--

135

00:06:52,833 --> 00:06:54,900 Dean Rusk at State,

136

00:06:54,900 --> 00:06:57,466 Robert McNamara at Defense,

137

00:06:57,466 --> 00:07:01,566 McGeorge Bundy as his National Security Advisor.

138

00:07:01,566 --> 00:07:06,833 "I need you," he told them, more than his predecessor had.

139

00:07:06,833 --> 00:07:08,633 Publicly, Johnson pledged

140

00:07:08,633 --> 00:07:11,166 that "This nation will keep its commitments

141

00:07:11,166 --> 00:07:14,333 from South Vietnam to West Berlin."

142

00:07:14,333 --> 00:07:18,033 But privately, Vietnam filled him with dread.

143

00:07:18,033 --> 00:07:20,500 "It's going to be hell in a handbasket out there,"

144

00:07:20,500 --> 00:07:23,366 his ambassador told him.

145

00:07:23,366 --> 00:07:26,666 "I want the South Vietnamese to get off their butts

146

00:07:26,666 --> 00:07:28,433 "and get out into those jungles

147

00:07:28,433 --> 00:07:32,733 and whip the hell out of some communists," the president said.

148

00:07:32,733 --> 00:07:35,533 "And then I want 'em to leave me alone,

149

00:07:35,533 --> 00:07:37,700 "because I've got some bigger things to do

150

00:07:37,700 --> 00:07:39,733 right here at home."

151

00:07:41,500 --> 00:07:44,833 Johnson had opposed the military coup that had overthrown

152

00:07:44,833 --> 00:07:49,100 and murdered South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem,

153

00:07:49,100 --> 00:07:52,500 fearing it would make a bad situation worse.

154

00:07:54,200 --> 00:07:55,900 It had.

155

00:07:55,900 --> 00:07:58,166 (gunfire, shouting)

156

00:08:00,100 --> 00:08:04,933 The National Liberation Front-- the Viet Cong--

157

00:08:04,933 --> 00:08:08,100 was making coordinated attacks throughout the countryside,

158

00:08:08,100 --> 00:08:11,533 some 400 of them in just two weeks. LE QUAN CONG: VIET CONG When Diem was overthrown, we were so exited, we thought we were close to liberating the whole country. We began attacking the enemy day and night. More and more puppet soldiers surrendered or defected to our side. More and more young people joined our armed forces.

159

00:08:36,200 --> 00:08:39,466 NARRATOR: An estimated 40% of the South Vietnamese countryside,

160

00:08:39,466 --> 00:08:42,033 and more than 50% of the people,

161

00:08:42,033 --> 00:08:45,966 were effectively in the hands of the Viet Cong.

162

00:08:45,966 --> 00:08:49,800 And the Vietnamese generals who had overthrown Ngo Dinh Diem

163

00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,533 were bickering among themselves.

164

00:08:53,533 --> 00:08:56,600 ROBERT RHEAULT: SPECIAL FORCES The assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem set in motion

165

00:08:56,600 --> 00:08:58,633 a series of coups.

166

00:08:58,633 --> 00:09:03,033 Each government was less effective than the one before.

167

00:09:03,033 --> 00:09:06,533 NARRATOR: In January 1964,

168

00:09:06,533 --> 00:09:08,166 with U.S. encouragement,

169

00:09:08,166 --> 00:09:12,933 General Nguyen Khanh staged yet another coup.

170

00:09:12,933 --> 00:09:17,666 In March, Johnson sent McNamara to Vietnam with instructions

171

00:09:17,666 --> 00:09:21,000 to show the people that Khanh was "our boy."

172

00:09:22,966 --> 00:09:26,466 SAM WILSON: ARMY Johnson said, "Let's get him out and get him speaking to people,

173

00:09:26,466 --> 00:09:30,133 "and let McNamara go with him as well

174

00:09:30,133 --> 00:09:32,666 "so that people can see that the United States

175

00:09:32,666 --> 00:09:33,933 is solidly behind this man."

176

00:09:33,933 --> 00:09:37,300 ROBERT MCNAMARA: We fully support the people of South Vietnam.

177

00:09:37,300 --> 00:09:39,200 BUI DIEM (speaking English): SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT It was natural for the American to support the man on the spot. So he went along with General Khanh in a kind of trip somewhere in the countryside.

178

00:09:49,066 --> 00:09:55,800 SAM WILSON" When Khanh gave a tedious, long, laborious speech ending up with,

179

00:09:55,800 --> 00:09:58,666 "Vietnam (speaking Vietnamese), Vietnam (speaking Vietnamese),

180

00:09:58,666 --> 00:10:00,333 Vietnam a thousand years."

181

00:10:00,333 --> 00:10:03,700 McNamara leaned over to the microphone and said...

182

00:10:03,700 --> 00:10:06,833 MCNAMARA: (attempting to repeat Vietnamese phrase)

183

00:10:06,833 --> 00:10:11,800 BUI DIEM: The American pronounce it has a different meaning in Vietnamese.

184

00:10:11,800 --> 00:10:13,066 (McNamara attempting to repeat Vietnamese phrase)

185

00:10:13,066 --> 00:10:14,600 SAM WILSON: What he was saying was something like,

186

00:10:14,600 --> 00:10:18,233 "The little duck, he wants to lie down."

187

00:10:18,233 --> 00:10:19,533 MCNAMARA: (attempting to repeat Vietnamese phrase)

188

00:10:19,533 --> 00:10:22,933 WILSON: He wasn't aware of the tonal difference.

189

00:10:22,933 --> 00:10:28,400 And McNamara grabbed one fist and held them up.

190

00:10:28,400 --> 00:10:29,733 And the crowd practically

191

00:10:29,733 --> 00:10:31,833 disintegrated on the cobblestones.

MINUTES 10-20

192

00:10:34,000 --> 00:10:35,833 NARRATOR: "No more of this coup shit,"

193

00:10:35,833 --> 00:10:38,500 President Johnson told his advisors.

194

00:10:38,500 --> 00:10:42,466 But Khanh, too, lacked popular legitimacy,

195

00:10:42,466 --> 00:10:46,133 and other generals continued to jockey for power.

196

00:10:46,133 --> 00:10:49,700 Washington turned a deaf ear to Buddhist calls

197

00:10:49,700 --> 00:10:52,333 for the genuinely representative government

198

00:10:52,333 --> 00:10:56,200 they'd hoped they'd get when Diem was overthrown. [2]

199

00:10:56,200 --> 00:11:01,700 Between January 1964 and June of 1965,

200

00:11:01,700 --> 00:11:05,700 there would be eight different governments.

201

00:11:05,700 --> 00:11:08,266 All of their leaders were so close to the Americans

202

00:11:08,266 --> 00:11:10,866 that they were seen as puppets. [3]

203

00:11:10,866 --> 00:11:12,700 (shouting, whistling)

204

00:11:12,700 --> 00:11:14,866 One weary Johnson aide suggested

205

00:11:14,866 --> 00:11:17,733 that the national symbol of South Vietnam

206

00:11:17,733 --> 00:11:19,633 should be a turnstile.

207

00:11:19,633 --> 00:11:22,666 MURRAY FROMSON: These demonstrating students seem to symbolize

208

00:11:22,666 --> 00:11:26,600 the kind of anarchy that is descending on Saigon these days.

209

00:11:26,600 --> 00:11:29,166 This kind of political backbiting is having

210

00:11:29,166 --> 00:11:31,366 serious consequences in the countryside,

211

00:11:31,366 --> 00:11:33,666 for until a strong government begins to function

212

00:11:33,666 --> 00:11:35,166 here in Saigon,

213

00:11:35,166 --> 00:11:37,466 the war against the communists will continue to founder.

214

00:11:42,600 --> 00:11:47,100 DONG SI NGUYEN: NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY It's very difficult to talk about Uncle Ho. I was close to him. Once a senior cadre asked him "uncle, how come you wear rubber sandals and such simple khaki clothes?" And Ho asked him, "If your people are barefoot, what do you do? Who's above whom?"

215

00:12:15,900 --> 00:12:20,200 NARRATOR: Ho Chi Minh was still a beloved figure in North Vietnam,

216

00:12:20,200 --> 00:12:24,100 still concerned that his country remained fragile,

217

00:12:24,100 --> 00:12:27,633 still wary that stepping up the conflict in the South

218

00:12:27,633 --> 00:12:31,833 might force the Americans to take a still more active role.

219

00:12:31,833 --> 00:12:37,133 But Ho now shared power with younger, more impatient leaders.

220

00:12:37,133 --> 00:12:41,066 There had been change and turmoil in North Vietnam, too,

221

00:12:41,066 --> 00:12:44,633 just as there had been in Saigon and Washington,

222

00:12:44,633 --> 00:12:47,533 though Americans knew almost nothing about it.

223

00:12:50,233 --> 00:12:53,933 HUY DUC: NORTH VIETNAM There were two factions in the North. Although they agreed on liberating the South, they were still debating how much violence should be used.

224

00:13:02,833 --> 00:13:05,566 NARRATOR: At the Ninth Party Plenum that began in Hanoi

225

00:13:05,566 --> 00:13:09,066 on November 22, 1963,

226

00:13:09,066 --> 00:13:12,066 the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas,

227

00:13:12,066 --> 00:13:17,133 the Politburo had argued over how best to proceed in the war.

228

00:13:17,133 --> 00:13:20,633 North Vietnam's two communist patrons,

229

00:13:20,633 --> 00:13:26,366 the Soviet Union and China, were giving them conflicting advice.

230

00:13:26,366 --> 00:13:28,200 NGUYEN NGOC: NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY We called them the two big brothers. The USSR has a new policy of de-escalating the Cold War, while China urged worldwide revolution through violence.

231

00:13:40,966 --> 00:13:43,833 NARRATOR: In two weeks of sometimes bitter debate,

232

00:13:43,833 --> 00:13:46,766 Ho Chi Minh, who favored the Soviet strategy,

233

00:13:46,766 --> 00:13:50,633 was outmaneuvered by party First Secretary Le Duan, [4]

234

00:13:50,633 --> 00:13:54,166 who sided with the Chinese.

235

00:13:54,166 --> 00:13:59,766 NGUYEN NGOC: So when they cast their ballots, Ho excused himself and left the room. After that, Ho Chi Minh's actual power was significantly diminished. From then on, the person with total power, and who controlled the war, was Le Duan.

236

00:14:13,966 --> 00:14:17,200 NARRATOR: Le Duan believed that with Diem gone,

237

00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:19,500 and the Saigon government in disarray,

238

00:14:19,500 --> 00:14:24,066 it was time to move quickly in 1964. [5]

239

00:14:24,066 --> 00:14:29,300 He proposed a two-phase plan for victory in South Vietnam.

240

00:14:29,300 --> 00:14:32,033 The first phase would destroy ARVN forces

241

00:14:32,033 --> 00:14:34,900 through big, "decisive battles";

242

00:14:34,900 --> 00:14:38,700 the second, an attack on the cities, Le Duan believed,

243

00:14:38,700 --> 00:14:42,533 would then set off popular revolts within them.

244

00:14:42,533 --> 00:14:44,666 Party leaders and others

245

00:14:44,666 --> 00:14:47,266 suspected of having opposed the plan

246

00:14:47,266 --> 00:14:50,666 were denounced as "revisionists,"[6] demoted,

247

00:14:50,666 --> 00:14:53,066 dismissed, imprisoned.

248

00:14:53,066 --> 00:14:56,666 Hundreds were sent to "re-education camps."

249

00:14:56,666 --> 00:15:01,866 "Uncle Ho wavers," Le Duan said, "but I have only one goal--

250

00:15:01,866 --> 00:15:03,633 final victory."

251

00:15:06,100 --> 00:15:07,900 WOMAN: Secretary McNamara on line 0.

252

00:15:07,900 --> 00:15:09,033 JOHNSON: Bob?

253

00:15:09,033 --> 00:15:10,633 McNAMARA: Yes, Mr. President?

254

00:15:10,633 --> 00:15:12,066 JOHNSON: I hate to bother you, but...

255

00:15:12,066 --> 00:15:13,066 McNAMARA: No trouble at all.

256

00:15:13,066 --> 00:15:14,833 JOHNSON: Tell me, have we got anybody

257

00:15:14,833 --> 00:15:17,800 that's got a military mind that can give us some military plans

258

00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:19,466 for winning that war?

259

00:15:19,466 --> 00:15:21,533 Let's get some more of something, my friend,

260

00:15:21,533 --> 00:15:23,133 because I'm going to have a heart attack

261

00:15:23,133 --> 00:15:24,333 if you don't get me something.

262

00:15:24,333 --> 00:15:26,533 We need somebody over there that can get us

263

00:15:26,533 --> 00:15:28,000 some better plans than we got, [7]

264

00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:31,033 because what we got is what we've had since '54.

265

00:15:31,033 --> 00:15:32,666 We're not getting it done.

266

00:15:32,666 --> 00:15:34,166 We're-we're losing.

267

00:15:34,166 --> 00:15:36,266 McNAMARA: Well, it's one reason I want to go back.

268

00:15:36,266 --> 00:15:37,566 Kick 'em in the tail a little bit

269

00:15:37,566 --> 00:15:38,666 will help here at this point.

270

00:15:38,666 --> 00:15:39,800 JOHNSON: Yeah.

271

00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:42,066 What I want is somebody to lay up some plans

272

00:15:42,066 --> 00:15:45,133 to trap these guys and whup hell out of 'em.

273

00:15:45,133 --> 00:15:46,400 Kill some of 'em.

274

00:15:46,400 --> 00:15:48,066 That's what I want to do.

275

00:15:48,066 --> 00:15:50,166 McNAMARA: I'll try and bring something back

276

00:15:50,166 --> 00:15:51,200 that will meet that objective.

277

00:15:51,200 --> 00:15:52,633 JOHNSON: Okay, Bob.

278

00:15:52,633 --> 00:15:53,700 McNAMARA: Thank you.

279

00:15:53,700 --> 00:15:54,700 (phone hangs up)

280

00:15:56,366 --> 00:15:59,333 NARRATOR: When his counselors urged him to do so,

281

00:15:59,333 --> 00:16:03,700 Johnson increased the number of American military personnel

282

00:16:03,700 --> 00:16:08,766 from 16,000 to more than 23,000 by the end of the year.

283

00:16:08,766 --> 00:16:11,900 But he wanted his own team in Saigon.

284

00:16:11,900 --> 00:16:14,433 He replaced Henry Cabot Lodge,

285

00:16:14,433 --> 00:16:18,066 making General Maxwell Taylor his ambassador,

286

00:16:18,066 --> 00:16:22,933 and selected 49-year-old General William Westmoreland,

287

00:16:22,933 --> 00:16:26,766 a decorated commander from WWII and Korea,

288

00:16:26,766 --> 00:16:29,733 to lead the American military effort.

289

00:16:29,733 --> 00:16:34,066 The president hoped to force Hanoi to abandon its support

290

00:16:34,066 --> 00:16:36,233 for the guerrilla struggle in the South

291

00:16:36,233 --> 00:16:40,266 by gradually escalating military pressure.

292

00:16:40,266 --> 00:16:44,833 He authorized American pilots to bomb North Vietnamese troops [8]

293

00:16:44,833 --> 00:16:49,533 and installations in the neighboring country of Laos.

294

00:16:49,533 --> 00:16:51,466 And he directed the military

295

00:16:51,466 --> 00:16:53,733 to oversee South Vietnamese [9] shelling

296

00:16:53,733 --> 00:16:59,300 of North Vietnamese islands and raids on coastal bases.

297

00:16:59,300 --> 00:17:02,966 All of it was to be conducted in secret. [10]

298

00:17:02,966 --> 00:17:05,666 The American people were not to be told.

299

00:17:05,666 --> 00:17:08,966 It was an election year.

300

00:17:08,966 --> 00:17:12,766 Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt strongly

301

00:17:12,766 --> 00:17:14,433 that the United States was fighting

302

00:17:14,433 --> 00:17:16,233 on the enemy's terms

303

00:17:16,233 --> 00:17:20,133 and urged far more drastic and dramatic action--

304

00:17:20,133 --> 00:17:24,566 air strikes against "critical targets" in North Vietnam itself

305

00:17:24,566 --> 00:17:28,866 and the deployment of U.S. forces in South Vietnam--

306

00:17:28,866 --> 00:17:30,800 boots on the ground.

307

00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:35,066 Johnson refused, [11] fearing that such aggressive moves

308

00:17:35,066 --> 00:17:37,333 would pull China into the conflict

309

00:17:37,333 --> 00:17:42,166 just as it had entered the Korean War in 1950.

310

00:17:43,166 --> 00:17:44,366 JOHNSON: They say get in or get out.

311

00:17:44,366 --> 00:17:45,366 McGEORGE BUNDY: Yeah.

312

00:17:45,366 --> 00:17:46,733 JOHNSON: And I told them,

313

00:17:46,733 --> 00:17:48,933 we haven't got any Congress that will go with us,

314

00:17:48,933 --> 00:17:51,333 and we haven't got any mothers that will go with us

315

00:17:51,333 --> 00:17:53,366 in the war, and I got to win an election

316

00:17:53,366 --> 00:17:57,366 and then you can make a decision.

317

00:17:57,366 --> 00:17:59,466 (crowd cheering)

318

00:17:59,466 --> 00:18:01,233 NARRATOR: Polls showed him with a commanding lead

319

00:18:01,233 --> 00:18:03,433 over his likely Republican opponent,

320

00:18:03,433 --> 00:18:07,166 Senator Barry F. Goldwater of Arizona,

321

00:18:07,166 --> 00:18:10,933 a blunt, uncompromising critic of what he charged

322

00:18:10,933 --> 00:18:13,100 was the administration's weakness

323

00:18:13,100 --> 00:18:15,800 in the face of communist aggression.

324

00:18:15,800 --> 00:18:18,066 BARRY GOLDWATER: Why does he put off facing the question

325

00:18:18,066 --> 00:18:21,166 of what to do about Vietnam?

326

00:18:21,166 --> 00:18:24,466 Does he hope that he can wait until after the election

327

00:18:24,466 --> 00:18:27,066 to confront the American public with the...

328

00:18:27,066 --> 00:18:30,566 BILL EHRHART: Here were these communists who were overrunning Southeast Asia

329

00:18:30,566 --> 00:18:33,833 and Johnson's doing nothing about it.

330

00:18:33,833 --> 00:18:35,100 BARRY GOLDWATER: My opponent has not told you

331

00:18:35,100 --> 00:18:36,666 what he plans to do about the Cold War.

332

00:18:36,666 --> 00:18:40,000 BILL EHRHART: PERKASIE, PA I rode around the back of a flatbed truck in Perkasie

333

00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:41,866 with a bunch of my classmates

334

00:18:41,866 --> 00:18:44,233 singing Barry Goldwater campaign songs

335

00:18:44,233 --> 00:18:47,566 because Lyndon Johnson was not tough enough

336

00:18:47,566 --> 00:18:49,200 on those communists.

337

00:18:51,566 --> 00:18:54,766 NARRATOR: Johnson felt he did not yet have the political capital

338

00:18:54,766 --> 00:18:59,466 to take further action in Vietnam, but he asked his aide,

339

00:18:59,466 --> 00:19:03,366 William Bundy, to draft a Congressional resolution

340

00:19:03,366 --> 00:19:06,500 authorizing him to use force if needed

341

00:19:06,500 --> 00:19:09,800 to be sent to Capitol Hill when the time was right.

342

00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:18,033 On July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese ships

343

00:19:18,033 --> 00:19:20,766 under the direction of the U.S. military

344

00:19:20,766 --> 00:19:26,100 shelled two North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin.

345

00:19:26,100 --> 00:19:31,100 The tiny North Vietnamese Navy was put on high alert.

346

00:19:31,100 --> 00:19:34,166 What followed was one of the most controversial

347

00:19:34,166 --> 00:19:37,666 and consequential events in American history.

348

00:19:37,666 --> 00:19:40,533 On the afternoon of August 2,

349

00:19:40,533 --> 00:19:44,066 the destroyer U.S.S. Maddox was moving slowly

350

00:19:44,066 --> 00:19:46,466 through international waters in the gulf

351

00:19:46,466 --> 00:19:50,300 on an intelligence-gathering mission in support

352

00:19:50,300 --> 00:19:54,266 of further South Vietnamese action against the North.

353

00:19:54,266 --> 00:19:58,666 The commander of a North Vietnamese torpedo-boat squadron

354

00:19:58,666 --> 00:20:01,366 moved to attack the Maddox.

355

00:20:01,366 --> 00:20:06,333 The Americans opened fire and missed.

356

00:20:06,333 --> 00:20:10,300 North Vietnamese torpedoes also missed.

357

00:20:10,300 --> 00:20:14,166 But carrier-based U.S. planes damaged

358

00:20:14,166 --> 00:20:16,233 two of the North Vietnamese boats

359

00:20:16,233 --> 00:20:19,333 and left a third dead in the water.

360

00:20:19,333 --> 00:20:23,833 Ho Chi Minh was shocked to hear of his navy's attack

361

00:20:23,833 --> 00:20:27,400 and demanded to know who had ordered it.

362

00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:30,133 The officer on duty was officially reprimanded

363

00:20:30,133 --> 00:20:32,166 for impulsiveness.

364

00:20:32,166 --> 00:20:36,866 No one may ever know who gave the order to attack.

365

00:20:36,866 --> 00:20:40,866 To this day, even the Vietnamese cannot agree.

366

00:20:40,866 --> 00:20:44,700 But some believe it was Le Duan.

MINUTES 20-30

367

00:20:44,700 --> 00:20:47,433 HUY DUC: The person behind the decision had to have been First Secretary Le Duan. In 1964, Le Duan wanted to elevate the war to a new level. NGUYEN NGOC: Why would a shrewd, calculating leader like Le Duan do that? The countryside was in our hands. And if the Americans hadn't intervened directly with a large military force by 1965, perhaps, the South Vietnamese regime would have collapsed.

368

00:21:29,966 --> 00:21:31,166 NARRATOR: Back in Washington,

369

00:21:31,166 --> 00:21:34,233 the Joint Chiefs urged immediate retaliation

370

00:21:34,233 --> 00:21:36,100 against North Vietnam.

371

00:21:36,100 --> 00:21:38,933 The president refused.

372

00:21:38,933 --> 00:21:41,533 Instead, the White House issued a warning

373

00:21:41,533 --> 00:21:44,633 about the "grave consequences" that would follow

374

00:21:44,633 --> 00:21:48,433 what it called "any further unprovoked" attacks--

375

00:21:48,433 --> 00:21:52,633 even though Johnson knew the attack had been provoked

376

00:21:52,633 --> 00:21:57,366 by the South Vietnamese raids on North Vietnam's islands.

377

00:21:57,366 --> 00:22:01,333 Both sides were playing a dangerous game.

378

00:22:01,333 --> 00:22:06,333 On August 4, American radio operators mistranslated

379

00:22:06,333 --> 00:22:08,100 North Vietnamese radio traffic

380

00:22:08,100 --> 00:22:14,000 and concluded a new military operation was imminent.

381

00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:16,166 Actually, Hanoi had simply called upon

382

00:22:16,166 --> 00:22:20,333 torpedo boat commanders to be ready for a new raid

383

00:22:20,333 --> 00:22:22,800 by the South Vietnamese.

384

00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:27,566 The Maddox and another destroyer, the Turner Joy,

385

00:22:27,566 --> 00:22:30,666 braced for a fresh attack.

386

00:22:30,666 --> 00:22:32,400 So did the White House.

387

00:22:32,400 --> 00:22:34,100 LYNDON JOHNSON: Go ahead, Mac.

388

00:22:34,100 --> 00:22:36,666 McNAMARA: I-I personally would recommend to you,

389

00:22:36,666 --> 00:22:38,633 after a second attack on our ships,

390

00:22:38,633 --> 00:22:42,466 that we do retaliate against the coast of North Vietnam

391

00:22:42,466 --> 00:22:44,033 some way or other...

392

00:22:44,033 --> 00:22:47,666 JOHNSON: What I was thinking about when I was eating breakfast:

393

00:22:47,666 --> 00:22:50,533 when they move on us and they shoot at us,

394

00:22:50,533 --> 00:22:52,200 I think we not only ought to shoot at them,

395

00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:54,600 but almost simultaneously pull one of these things

396

00:22:54,600 --> 00:22:56,666 that you've been doing on one of their bridges or something.

397

00:22:56,666 --> 00:22:57,866 McNAMARA: Exactly.

398

00:22:57,866 --> 00:22:59,633 I quite agree with you, Mr. President.

399

00:22:59,633 --> 00:23:01,366 JOHNSON: But I wish we could have something

400

00:23:01,366 --> 00:23:03,300 that we've already picked out,

401

00:23:03,300 --> 00:23:06,866 and just hit about three of them damn quick, right after.

402

00:23:06,866 --> 00:23:10,300 NARRATOR: No second attack ever happened,

403

00:23:10,300 --> 00:23:14,533 but at the time, anxious American sonar operators

404

00:23:14,533 --> 00:23:19,366 aboard the Maddox and Turner Joy convinced themselves one had.

405

00:23:19,366 --> 00:23:24,166 The attack was probable but not certain, Johnson was told,

406

00:23:24,166 --> 00:23:27,266 and since it had probably occurred,

407

00:23:27,266 --> 00:23:31,366 the president decided it should not go unanswered.

408

00:23:33,733 --> 00:23:37,200 JOHNSON: Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers

409

00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:41,733 of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression

410

00:23:41,733 --> 00:23:45,966 on the high seas against the United States of America.

411

00:23:45,966 --> 00:23:49,833 Yet our response, for the present,

412

00:23:49,833 --> 00:23:52,400 will be limited and fitting.

413

00:23:52,400 --> 00:23:57,900 We Americans know, although others appear to forget,

414

00:23:57,900 --> 00:24:00,700 the risk of spreading conflict.

415

00:24:00,700 --> 00:24:06,300 We still seek no wider war.

416

00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:09,766 EVERETT ALVAREZ: NAVY PILOT If that came to be where we would be called upon

417

00:24:09,766 --> 00:24:12,733 to carry out our responsibilities,

418

00:24:12,733 --> 00:24:15,433 and having been well trained for this,

419

00:24:15,433 --> 00:24:17,100 I never really gave it much thought.

420

00:24:17,100 --> 00:24:19,466 It was part of my duty.

421

00:24:19,466 --> 00:24:23,033 NARRATOR: Lieutenant Everett Alvarez from Salinas, California,

422

00:24:23,033 --> 00:24:26,766 was aboard the U.S.S. carrier Constellation.

423

00:24:26,766 --> 00:24:30,433 His squadron of Skyhawk A-4 planes

424

00:24:30,433 --> 00:24:33,133 was ordered to attack torpedo boat installations

425

00:24:33,133 --> 00:24:37,766 and oil facilities near the port of Hon Gai.

426

00:24:37,766 --> 00:24:42,566 For the first time, American pilots were going to drop bombs

427

00:24:42,566 --> 00:24:44,600 on North Vietnam. [12]

428

00:24:45,866 --> 00:24:47,200 ALVAREZ: When we approached the target

429

00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:48,933 coming down from altitude,

430

00:24:48,933 --> 00:24:52,133 it was obvious that they could pick us up on their radar.

431

00:24:52,133 --> 00:24:54,700 I remember my knees shaking.

432

00:24:54,700 --> 00:24:57,600 And I was saying, "Holy smokes, I'm going into war."

433

00:24:59,500 --> 00:25:01,633 "This is war."

434

00:25:02,733 --> 00:25:04,466 I was a bit scared.

435

00:25:04,466 --> 00:25:09,300 Once we went in and they started firing at us,

436

00:25:09,300 --> 00:25:11,700 the fear went away.

437

00:25:11,700 --> 00:25:16,466 Everything became smooth, deathly quiet in the cockpit.

438

00:25:16,466 --> 00:25:19,300 It was sort of like a symphony

439

00:25:19,300 --> 00:25:24,866 in the sense that my plane was just like a ballet in the sky,

440

00:25:24,866 --> 00:25:28,366 and I was just performing what I was doing.

441

00:25:30,566 --> 00:25:31,700 And then I got hit.

442

00:25:31,700 --> 00:25:32,900 MAN: Mayday, Mayday.

443

00:25:32,900 --> 00:25:34,166 (instruments beeping)

444

00:25:34,166 --> 00:25:37,966 NARRATOR: Coastal militiamen captured Alvarez

445

00:25:37,966 --> 00:25:40,500 and turned him over to the North Vietnamese military.

446

00:25:40,500 --> 00:25:46,266 ALVAREZ: One fella was yelling at me in Vietnamese and saying something.

447

00:25:46,266 --> 00:25:49,333 I started talking to him in Spanish.

448

00:25:49,333 --> 00:25:51,300 Don't ask me why.

449

00:25:51,300 --> 00:25:54,333 It seemed like a good idea at the time.

450

00:25:56,266 --> 00:26:01,566 After when they discovered U.S.A. on my ID card

451

00:26:01,566 --> 00:26:06,600 and then they started speaking to me in English.

452

00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:10,800 NARRATOR: Alvarez assumed he would be treated as a prisoner of war.

453

00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:13,133 ALVAREZ: I was sticking to the code of conduct,

454

00:26:13,133 --> 00:26:15,500 which is giving them name, rank, service number,

455

00:26:15,500 --> 00:26:16,733 and date of birth.

456

00:26:18,266 --> 00:26:22,366 But they quickly reminded me that there was no state of war,

457

00:26:22,366 --> 00:26:25,066 no declaration of war.

458

00:26:25,066 --> 00:26:28,800 So I could not be considered a prisoner of war.

459

00:26:30,333 --> 00:26:31,833 I recall thinking about it,

460

00:26:31,833 --> 00:26:33,533 and I says, "You know what?

461

00:26:33,533 --> 00:26:35,066 They're right."

462

00:26:35,066 --> 00:26:38,433 NARRATOR: Everett Alvarez was the first American airman

463

00:26:38,433 --> 00:26:41,866 to be shot out of the sky over North Vietnam

464

00:26:41,866 --> 00:26:44,566 and the first to be imprisoned there.

465

00:26:47,100 --> 00:26:49,500 Now, the president sent up to Capitol Hill

466

00:26:49,500 --> 00:26:53,233 the resolution he had asked his aide William Bundy to draft

467

00:26:53,233 --> 00:26:55,766 two months earlier.

468

00:26:55,766 --> 00:26:59,700 JAMES WILLBANKS: ARMY ADVISOR Johnson is sort of prepositioned to move anyway,

469

00:26:59,700 --> 00:27:03,633 and it gives him really the incident that he needs

470

00:27:03,633 --> 00:27:06,300 to go to Congress and ask for a resolution

471

00:27:06,300 --> 00:27:08,433 that will allow him to deal with what he sees

472

00:27:08,433 --> 00:27:10,200 as aggression in Vietnam.

473

00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:12,633 And what he gets is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,

474

00:27:12,633 --> 00:27:16,366 which is, what he says, like "Grandma's nightshirt"--

475

00:27:16,366 --> 00:27:17,900 it covers everything.

476

00:27:17,900 --> 00:27:22,366 I think what Johnson is looking for is the opportunity,

477

00:27:22,366 --> 00:27:26,333 the right time to send a message to North Vietnam

478

00:27:26,333 --> 00:27:30,400 that we're serious about supporting South Vietnam.

479

00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:32,600 That message is sent,

480

00:27:32,600 --> 00:27:34,433 I think we misread the enemy

481

00:27:34,433 --> 00:27:36,700 because they're just as serious as we are.

482

00:27:38,100 --> 00:27:41,233 NARRATOR: On August 7, 1964,

483

00:27:41,233 --> 00:27:45,000 by a vote of 88-2, the Senate passed

484

00:27:45,000 --> 00:27:49,166 what came to be called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

485

00:27:49,166 --> 00:27:53,533 In the House, not a single congressman opposed it.

486

00:27:53,533 --> 00:27:57,366 Senator Goldwater could no longer plausibly claim

487

00:27:57,366 --> 00:27:59,533 Johnson was failing to fight back

488

00:27:59,533 --> 00:28:03,433 against North Vietnam, while those voters concerned

489

00:28:03,433 --> 00:28:05,566 that the United States was in danger

490

00:28:05,566 --> 00:28:08,000 of becoming too deeply involved

491

00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:12,000 admired the president's measured response.

492

00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:15,833 Support for Johnson's handling of the war jumped overnight

493

00:28:15,833 --> 00:28:19,400 from 42% to 72%.

494

00:28:19,400 --> 00:28:22,400 The American public believed their president.

495

00:28:23,600 --> 00:28:27,233 Le Duan and his comrades in Hanoi did not.

496

00:28:27,233 --> 00:28:29,966 They had little faith in the president's claim

497

00:28:29,966 --> 00:28:32,100 that he sought no wider war.

498

00:28:32,100 --> 00:28:35,100 They resolved to step up their efforts

499

00:28:35,100 --> 00:28:36,700 to win the struggle in the South

500

00:28:36,700 --> 00:28:39,833 before the United States escalated its presence

501

00:28:39,833 --> 00:28:42,100 by sending in combat troops.

502

00:28:43,366 --> 00:28:45,466 For the first time, [13]

503

00:28:45,466 --> 00:28:48,166 Hanoi began sending North Vietnamese regulars

504

00:28:48,166 --> 00:28:50,900 into the South, down the network of paths

505

00:28:50,900 --> 00:28:54,200 they had hacked out of the Laotian jungle-- [14]

506

00:28:54,200 --> 00:28:56,200 the Ho Chi Minh Trail. [15]

507

00:28:57,466 --> 00:28:59,333 PETER KALISCHER: This is Bien Hoa Air Base,

508

00:28:59,333 --> 00:29:00,966 the biggest in South Vietnam,

509

00:29:00,966 --> 00:29:04,800 hours after being hit by a communist mortar barrage.

510

00:29:04,800 --> 00:29:07,966 NARRATOR: On November 1, Viet Cong guerrillas shelled

511

00:29:07,966 --> 00:29:12,133 the American airbase at Bien Hoa near Saigon.

512

00:29:12,133 --> 00:29:14,533 Five Americans died.

513

00:29:14,533 --> 00:29:16,666 Thirty were wounded.

514

00:29:16,666 --> 00:29:20,933 Five B-57 bombers were destroyed on the ground

515

00:29:20,933 --> 00:29:22,933 and 15 more were damaged.

516

00:29:22,933 --> 00:29:24,800 PETER KALISCHER: Mr. Ambassador,

517

00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:26,966 do you think this shows any new capability

518

00:29:26,966 --> 00:29:29,100 that they've got, the Viet Cong?

519

00:29:29,100 --> 00:29:31,433 MAXWELL TAYLOR: (U.S. AMBASSADOR) Uh, I would simply say they've never done this before.

520

00:29:34,166 --> 00:29:36,700 NARRATOR: The Joint Chiefs advised the president to mount

521

00:29:36,700 --> 00:29:41,233 an immediate all-out air attack on 94 targets in the North

522

00:29:41,233 --> 00:29:44,566 and to send in regular Army and Marine units--

523

00:29:44,566 --> 00:29:48,633 not more advisors-- to South Vietnam as well.

524

00:29:48,633 --> 00:29:50,133 He would not do it.

525

00:29:50,133 --> 00:29:52,633 The election was just two days away.

MINUTES 30-40

526

00:29:54,966 --> 00:29:59,200 Lyndon Baines Johnson won the presidency in his own right,

527

00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:01,200 and he won it by a landslide.

528

00:30:03,066 --> 00:30:05,533 Within a month, the president would approve

529

00:30:05,533 --> 00:30:08,233 what was called a "graduated response"--

530

00:30:08,233 --> 00:30:12,233 limited air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos

531

00:30:12,233 --> 00:30:15,300 and "tit for tat" retaliatory raids

532

00:30:15,300 --> 00:30:18,300 on North Vietnamese targets.

533

00:30:18,300 --> 00:30:22,300 But he refused to undertake sustained bombing of the North

534

00:30:22,300 --> 00:30:26,366 until the South Vietnamese got their own house in order.

535

00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:33,433 In private, Johnson doubted that airpower alone would ever work

536

00:30:33,433 --> 00:30:36,000 and believed that he would eventually have to send in

537

00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:37,366 ground troops,

538

00:30:37,366 --> 00:30:40,933 though he was not yet willing publicly to say so.

539

00:30:46,900 --> 00:30:50,766 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: In the fall of '64, Denton was 17

540

00:30:50,766 --> 00:30:55,133 and he was determined to go into the service.

541

00:30:55,133 --> 00:30:59,100 NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker had been restless since the summer.

542

00:30:59,100 --> 00:31:02,333 After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, he had confided

543

00:31:02,333 --> 00:31:04,966 to his sister that he wanted to join the Navy,

544

00:31:04,966 --> 00:31:08,566 but he knew his parents would not sign the consent form

545

00:31:08,566 --> 00:31:13,166 that would have allowed a 17-year-old to enlist.

546

00:31:13,166 --> 00:31:17,000 CAROL CROCKER: He was talking about wanting to go into the service

547

00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,533 and that his attempts to go underage had failed.

548

00:31:19,533 --> 00:31:23,066 And that he wanted my parents to support him in that.

549

00:31:23,066 --> 00:31:25,566 NARRATOR: His parents tried to persuade him

550

00:31:25,566 --> 00:31:27,733 that he could be more useful to his country

551

00:31:27,733 --> 00:31:32,400 with a college education than as just another private.

552

00:31:32,400 --> 00:31:35,266 Mogie was adamant.

553

00:31:35,266 --> 00:31:38,933 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Monday morning he left for school.

554

00:31:38,933 --> 00:31:41,700 And I watched him leave.

555

00:31:41,700 --> 00:31:43,733 But that night he didn't come in for supper

556

00:31:43,733 --> 00:31:44,933 and he hadn't called.

557

00:31:44,933 --> 00:31:48,400 CAROL CROCKER: The day that my brother ran away has to be

558

00:31:48,400 --> 00:31:52,800 one of the most bizarre experiences in my life.

559

00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:55,966 I eventually happened to look in my piggy bank

560

00:31:55,966 --> 00:31:59,600 and he had taken the money I had and left a note for me.

561

00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:02,433 He had promised he would pay me back.

562

00:32:02,433 --> 00:32:05,266 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: He was gone about four months

563

00:32:05,266 --> 00:32:08,666 and said that he would not come home

564

00:32:08,666 --> 00:32:11,200 unless we agreed to sign for him.

565

00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:15,566 And he wouldn't be 18 until June.

566

00:32:15,566 --> 00:32:19,033 But we did agree and he did come home.

567

00:32:19,033 --> 00:32:23,700 My husband felt it was an honor-bound agreement.

568

00:32:23,700 --> 00:32:26,700 I was hoping that I could change his mind.

569

00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:31,600 ("The Marines' Hymn" plays)

570

00:32:31,600 --> 00:32:35,500 PHILIP BRADY: MARINE ADVISOR To my mind, the Marine Corps represented the very best.

571

00:32:35,500 --> 00:32:36,966 And it does.

572

00:32:36,966 --> 00:32:39,566 They are the best.

573

00:32:39,566 --> 00:32:42,066 And I wanted to be part of the best.

574

00:32:42,066 --> 00:32:43,833 I was competitive.

575

00:32:43,833 --> 00:32:45,000 I was pugnacious.

576

00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:47,133 But I wanted to get in the Marine Corps

577

00:32:47,133 --> 00:32:49,833 and go to the first war I could find.

578

00:32:49,833 --> 00:32:53,200 NARRATOR: Lieutenant Philip Brady, from Port Washington, New York,

579

00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:56,000 arrived in Saigon just a few days

580

00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:58,333 after Lyndon Johnson's election,

581

00:32:58,333 --> 00:33:01,133 one of the new advisors sent to help shore up

582

00:33:01,133 --> 00:33:04,066 the South Vietnamese military.

583

00:33:04,066 --> 00:33:08,433 GENERAL WESTMORELAND: We must ensure that women and children are not injured.

584

00:33:08,433 --> 00:33:11,833 NARRATOR: General Westmoreland himself greeted the newcomers.

585

00:33:11,833 --> 00:33:15,800 He was an impressive-looking man with an impressive record.

586

00:33:15,800 --> 00:33:20,100 Many of the men he'd led in Tunisia, Sicily, and Normandy

587

00:33:20,100 --> 00:33:23,900 during World War II called him Superman.

588

00:33:23,900 --> 00:33:26,166 He'd fought with distinction in Korea,

589

00:33:26,166 --> 00:33:29,000 commanded the 101st Airborne,

590

00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:31,833 served as superintendent of West Point.

591

00:33:31,833 --> 00:33:33,266 TIME magazine called him

592

00:33:33,266 --> 00:33:37,766 "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man."

593

00:33:37,766 --> 00:33:39,000 WESTMORELAND: But at the same time,

594

00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:41,133 win the hearts and the minds of the people.

595

00:33:41,133 --> 00:33:43,900 BRADY: General Westmoreland told us that we were down

596

00:33:43,900 --> 00:33:46,666 on the five-yard line and we just needed a few more

597

00:33:46,666 --> 00:33:50,666 to go get the touchdown.

598

00:33:50,666 --> 00:33:53,766 Then I went out and then I got on the ground.

599

00:33:53,766 --> 00:33:56,466 And then I found out, "Don't you realize?

600

00:33:56,466 --> 00:33:58,866 We're losing this war."

601

00:33:58,866 --> 00:34:03,600 NARRATOR: Lieutenant Brady was assigned to assist Captain Frank Eller,

602

00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:05,966 senior advisor to the 4th Battalion

603

00:34:05,966 --> 00:34:09,266 of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, an elite unit

604

00:34:09,266 --> 00:34:13,600 whose members called themselves the "Killer Sharks."

605

00:34:13,600 --> 00:34:17,466 BRADY: You were told that you were going over there to guide,

606

00:34:17,466 --> 00:34:21,699 educate, and elevate essentially these "little fellas"

607

00:34:21,699 --> 00:34:23,833 on how to fight a war

608

00:34:23,833 --> 00:34:27,000 when, in fact, they knew exactly how to fight the war.

609

00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:29,233 You were just an appendage.

610

00:34:29,233 --> 00:34:32,933 You were there simply to guide assets that they didn't have:

611

00:34:32,933 --> 00:34:37,366 American artillery, American air strikes.

612

00:34:37,366 --> 00:34:40,066 NARRATOR: Brady did his best to get to know

613

00:34:40,066 --> 00:34:42,266 the South Vietnamese marines in his unit.

614

00:34:43,966 --> 00:34:48,500 TRAN NGOC TOAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINES (speaking English): Phil Brady come in as an assistant of the senior advisor. I said that, "You are not my advisor, You are my helper." And also, "You are so tall and big. Stay away from me. Because if you get close to me some Viet Cong sniper will shoot, shoot at you and then they miss you and then hit me."

615

00:35:09,533 --> 00:35:13,400 NARRATOR: Lieutenant Tran Ngoc Toan, the son of a trucker,

616

00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:15,833 had escaped life with a hostile stepmother

617

00:35:15,833 --> 00:35:20,500 by entering the South Vietnamese Military Academy at Dalat.

618

00:35:20,500 --> 00:35:25,000 He'd been fighting the Viet Cong for more than two years.

619

00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:26,433 BRADY: Toan was one of the junior officers.

620

00:35:26,433 --> 00:35:27,900 I think he was a...

621

00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:29,333 I think he was a company commander.

622

00:35:29,333 --> 00:35:31,633 I knew him, I liked him.

623

00:35:31,633 --> 00:35:34,833 He was a Dalat graduate, which is like their West Point.

624

00:35:34,833 --> 00:35:36,633 Very dedicated. TOAN: Later we found out we understand each other more than that, because we are at the same generation.

625

00:35:46,633 --> 00:35:51,333 NARRATOR: Brady, Toan, and the 4th South Vietnamese Marine Battalion

626

00:35:51,333 --> 00:35:54,566 were stationed near the Bien Hoa Airbase in reserve,

627

00:35:54,566 --> 00:35:58,533 waiting to be called into action.

628

00:35:58,533 --> 00:36:00,433 There were new rumors now,

629

00:36:00,433 --> 00:36:05,133 of larger enemy units moving through the countryside.

630

00:36:05,133 --> 00:36:08,166 Le Duan's plan to win a quick and decisive victory

631

00:36:08,166 --> 00:36:09,900 was underway.

632

00:36:14,833 --> 00:36:18,433 NGUYEN VAN TONG: VIET CONG My youngest brother's name was Nguyen Thanh Hoang. He was a scout. He was killed. If you enter the cemetery, his grave is on your left. It's the sixth grave in the sixth row. We visit his grave once a year to remember him. [16] I would like to say one more thing. My brother had a fiancée. He brought her home to meet our mother. My mother was very happy to have her as a daughter-in-law. When my brother was killed, she refused to marry another man and took her own life instead. [17]

633

00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:10,900 NARRATOR: Nguyen Van Tong was a political officer

634

00:37:10,900 --> 00:37:14,066 in the newly created Viet Cong 9th Division,

635

00:37:14,066 --> 00:37:18,133 one of perhaps 2,000 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops

636

00:37:18,133 --> 00:37:23,000 who had for weeks been quietly filtering into Phuoc Tuy,

637

00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,100 a supposedly "pacified" province

638

00:37:25,100 --> 00:37:28,466 less than 40 miles southeast of Saigon.

639

00:37:30,233 --> 00:37:32,866 NGUYEN VAN TONG: My view was, in a war, if you cn't destroy the enemy's main forces, the enemy;s backbone, you can't win. If we didn't destroy those forces, the war would last forever.

640

00:37:49,566 --> 00:37:52,900 NARRATOR: The target for Tong and his comrades

641

00:37:52,900 --> 00:37:55,733 was the strategic hamlet of Binh Gia,

642

00:37:55,733 --> 00:38:00,200 home to some 6,000 Catholic anticommunist refugees.

643

00:38:01,833 --> 00:38:04,633 Their plan was to seize the hamlet

644

00:38:04,633 --> 00:38:08,466 and then annihilate the forces Saigon was sure to send

645

00:38:08,466 --> 00:38:10,066 to retake it.

646

00:38:10,066 --> 00:38:12,533 To ensure success,

647

00:38:12,533 --> 00:38:16,033 tons of heavy weapons were smuggled onto the coast[18]

648

00:38:16,033 --> 00:38:18,000 under cover of darkness--

649

00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:21,200 mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles

650

00:38:21,200 --> 00:38:24,166 capable of blasting tanks.

651

00:38:24,166 --> 00:38:26,866 The communists had never attempted

652

00:38:26,866 --> 00:38:29,833 anything on this scale before.

653

00:38:29,833 --> 00:38:33,133 Before dawn on December 28,

654

00:38:33,133 --> 00:38:37,333 Viet Cong advance units easily overwhelmed the village militia

655

00:38:37,333 --> 00:38:39,166 and occupied Binh Gia.

656

00:38:39,166 --> 00:38:40,333 (shouting, gunfire)

657

00:38:41,966 --> 00:38:45,033 When two crack South Vietnamese Ranger companies

658

00:38:45,033 --> 00:38:47,266 were helicoptered in the next day,

659

00:38:47,266 --> 00:38:51,333 they were ambushed and shot to pieces.

660

00:38:51,333 --> 00:38:53,733 On the morning of the 30th,

661

00:38:53,733 --> 00:38:57,066 Philip Brady, his friend Tran Ngoc Toan,

662

00:38:57,066 --> 00:39:01,066 and the 4th Marine Battalion were flown in to relieve

663

00:39:01,066 --> 00:39:03,733 and reinforce the Rangers.

664

00:39:03,733 --> 00:39:07,200 The enemy withdrew east of the village.

665

00:39:12,000 --> 00:39:15,933 NGUYEN VAN TONG: Around 5 p.m. a helicopter hovered over our position, right above the regimental command post. The regimental commander asked, "Can you shoot it down?" We said, "Yes, we can." And a minute later the helicopter was hit and burst into flames.

666

00:39:36,833 --> 00:39:41,333 BRADY: All of a sudden you could see the tracers come out

667

00:39:41,333 --> 00:39:44,933 of the plantation, hit the helicopter, it crashed.

668

00:39:44,933 --> 00:39:48,033 We were ordered to go down and retrieve the remains

669

00:39:48,033 --> 00:39:49,866 the following morning.

670

00:39:51,300 --> 00:39:53,766 NGUYEN VAN TONG: I came to the place where the helicopter crashed, and I saw four Americans dead. At that time, I didn't realize how valuable the lives of American advisors were.

TOAN: The commanding officer from Saigon told the battalion you have to come in and get all four American servicemen body.

TONG: They sent an entire battalion to retrieve four American advisors,

671

00:40:24,100 --> 00:40:26,733 BRADY: The lead company got to the remains

672

00:40:26,733 --> 00:40:30,666 and then was pounced on and mauled badly.

673

00:40:30,666 --> 00:40:33,033 (gunfire)

674

00:40:34,900 --> 00:40:38,400 NARRATOR: Twelve South Vietnamese Marines from Toan's unit were killed

675

00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:40,933 getting to the downed helicopter.

676

00:40:40,933 --> 00:40:42,800 Their comrades wrapped them in ponchos

677

00:40:42,800 --> 00:40:47,100 and laid them out next to the dead Americans.

678

00:40:47,100 --> 00:40:49,966 An American chopper dropped into the clearing.

679

00:40:49,966 --> 00:40:52,600 The American crew jumped out under fire,

680

00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:54,766 picked up the four Americans,

681

00:40:54,766 --> 00:40:58,433 climbed back into their chopper, and took off again.

MINUTES 40-50

682

00:40:59,433 --> 00:41:04,833 TRAN NGOC TOAN: And we told them, "Hey, try to get all my body out of here too." But hey refuse to pickup our body.

683

00:41:09,600 --> 00:41:14,900 NARRATOR: For three hours, Toan and his men stayed with their own dead

684

00:41:14,900 --> 00:41:19,066 waiting for a helicopter to carry them off the battlefield.

685

00:41:20,833 --> 00:41:24,166 BRADY: Meanwhile, I am getting a little bit antsy

686

00:41:24,166 --> 00:41:26,600 because, first of all, we're losing light.

687

00:41:26,600 --> 00:41:30,333 Second of all, we are now outside of artillery range.

688

00:41:30,333 --> 00:41:32,766 We've got to get out of there.

689

00:41:32,766 --> 00:41:34,966 TRAN NGOC TOAN: We have to move out of here because they coming. And we don't have time.

690

00:41:43,100 --> 00:41:46,266 BRADY: I went to the Major Nho, his name was, and I said,

691

00:41:46,266 --> 00:41:49,466 "Major, we have to get out of here now."

692

00:41:49,466 --> 00:41:53,966 And Nho said, "Don't you forget I am a major,

693

00:41:53,966 --> 00:41:55,066 and you are a lieutenant,"

694

00:41:55,066 --> 00:41:58,300 turned on his heel and walked away.

695

00:41:58,300 --> 00:42:02,700 Ten minutes later all hell broke loose.

696

00:42:05,566 --> 00:42:07,000 TRAN NGOC TOAN: They start shelling. They start shelling into our bodies. That's the first time in the war of Vietnam they start shelling before they attack.

697

00:42:07,000 --> 00:42:08,400 (man shouts in Vietnamese)

698

00:42:22,866 --> 00:42:25,900 NARRATOR: The shelling eventually died down.

699

00:42:25,900 --> 00:42:28,400 But then bugles blew,

700

00:42:28,400 --> 00:42:31,000 and wave after wave of enemy troops

701

00:42:31,000 --> 00:42:33,166 advanced toward the badly outnumbered men.

702

00:42:36,500 --> 00:42:39,933 BRADY: It was as if you turned a soundtrack of shooting...

703

00:42:43,300 --> 00:42:45,433 And just went (imitates rapid gunfire).

704

00:42:45,433 --> 00:42:46,600 Just like that.

705

00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:48,300 All of a sudden it came out of nowhere.

706

00:42:51,966 --> 00:42:55,300 We used what little air strikes we had left with helicopters,

707

00:42:55,300 --> 00:42:59,633 calling in the strikes on our position to slow it down.

708

00:42:59,633 --> 00:43:02,866 There was no way.

709

00:43:02,866 --> 00:43:04,800 TRAN NGOC TOAN: We are surrounded and they keep coming. I was shot. The first shot right here. And, then, the second shot was right here. The AK-47 put through right here, make a big hole like this. But I still keep fighting. I don't feel any pain at all. I don't have time to think about it.

710

00:43:38,100 --> 00:43:40,200 (explosions)

711

00:43:40,200 --> 00:43:43,333 BRADY: What we did was we tried to get out.

712

00:43:43,333 --> 00:43:46,366 Twenty-six of us broke through.

713

00:43:46,366 --> 00:43:49,233 Eleven ultimately made it.

714

00:43:49,233 --> 00:43:50,266 (gunfire)

715

00:43:50,266 --> 00:43:51,566 NARRATOR: All that night,

716

00:43:51,566 --> 00:43:53,700 the Viet Cong moved among the trees,

717

00:43:53,700 --> 00:43:55,566 carrying away their wounded

718

00:43:55,566 --> 00:43:58,566 and shooting any South Vietnamese troops

719

00:43:58,566 --> 00:44:00,900 they found alive.

720

00:44:00,900 --> 00:44:02,466 TRAN NGOC TOAN: I played dead. And the Viet Cong come in and they kick my body. One bullet will get through right here. And suddenly I feel, oh, I'm still alive. No problem. So I just play, still playing dead. And then they move back and they withdraw.

721

00:44:27,433 --> 00:44:29,566 NARRATOR: Cradling his rifle in his arms,

722

00:44:29,566 --> 00:44:33,300 Toan began trying to crawl toward Binh Gia.

723

00:44:33,300 --> 00:44:36,500 He was not found for three days.

724

00:44:37,800 --> 00:44:42,366 TRAN NGOC TOAN: And one of the paratroop, he come to pick me up and he said, "Oh it's horrible. He smell horrible. Like a dead rat." And I look back at all th worms and ants around my wounds. By that time, I have time to feel pain. Because all three days I'm trying to survive.

725

00:45:09,533 --> 00:45:14,166 NARRATOR: When it was all over, five Americans had died at Binh Gia.

726

00:45:14,166 --> 00:45:19,166 Thirty-two Viet Cong bodies had been left on the battlefield.

727

00:45:19,166 --> 00:45:22,800 200 South Vietnamese were killed;

728

00:45:22,800 --> 00:45:27,500 200 more were wounded.

729

00:45:27,500 --> 00:45:31,766 NGUYEN VAN TONG: I'll never forget those sights. Everywhere we went, we saw corpses of Saigon soldiers.

730

00:45:42,266 --> 00:45:45,066 BRADY: What it really said was

731

00:45:45,066 --> 00:45:49,466 they were capable of marshaling this kind of force.

732

00:45:49,466 --> 00:45:51,666 The Vietnamese officers I talked to in the Marine Corps

733

00:45:51,666 --> 00:45:54,366 figured they had six months before the end.

734

00:45:54,366 --> 00:45:57,933 NARRATOR: The big question after Binh Gia,

735

00:45:57,933 --> 00:46:00,333 an American officer at headquarters said,

736

00:46:00,333 --> 00:46:03,466 is how a thousand or more enemy troops

737

00:46:03,466 --> 00:46:07,000 "could wander around the countryside so close to Saigon

738

00:46:07,000 --> 00:46:09,000 "without being discovered.

739

00:46:09,000 --> 00:46:13,933 That tells you something about this war."

740

00:46:13,933 --> 00:46:16,433 Hanoi was exultant.

741

00:46:16,433 --> 00:46:19,633 Ho Chi Minh called it "a little Dien Bien Phu."

742

00:46:19,633 --> 00:46:24,100 Le Duan was convinced his strategy was working.

743

00:46:24,100 --> 00:46:27,533 "The liberation war of South Vietnam has progressed

744

00:46:27,533 --> 00:46:30,133 by leaps and bounds," he said.

745

00:46:30,133 --> 00:46:33,666 "After the battle of Ap Bac two years ago,

746

00:46:33,666 --> 00:46:37,600 "the enemy knew it would be difficult to defeat us.

747

00:46:37,600 --> 00:46:40,633 "After Binh Gia, the enemy realizes

748

00:46:40,633 --> 00:46:45,733 that he is in the process of being defeated by us."

749

00:46:45,733 --> 00:46:48,433 NGUYEN VAN TONG: I believe the battle at Binh Gia was a historic milestone in the war. If the Americans hadn't gotten involved, we would have entered Saigon in 1966.

750

00:47:00,200 --> 00:47:01,600 JOHNSON: JANUARY 20, 1965 I, Lyndon Baines Johnson,

751

00:47:01,600 --> 00:47:03,633 do solemnly swear...

752

00:47:03,633 --> 00:47:07,000 NARRATOR: Twenty-six days after the Binh Gia battle ended

753

00:47:07,000 --> 00:47:10,333 and just a week after President Johnson's inauguration,

754

00:47:10,333 --> 00:47:13,700 McGeorge Bundy handed the president a memorandum.

755

00:47:13,700 --> 00:47:15,900 I will to the best of my ability.

756

00:47:15,900 --> 00:47:19,733 NARRATOR: The current strategy was clearly not working, it said.

757

00:47:19,733 --> 00:47:23,233 The Viet Cong were on the move and on the rise,

758

00:47:23,233 --> 00:47:26,766 supplied and now steadily reinforced

759

00:47:26,766 --> 00:47:29,600 with soldiers from North Vietnam.

760

00:47:29,600 --> 00:47:34,333 If an independent South Vietnam was to survive,

761

00:47:34,333 --> 00:47:37,600 the United States needed to act fast.

762

00:47:37,600 --> 00:47:41,533 The administration faced two choices, Bundy said.

763

00:47:41,533 --> 00:47:44,100 It could go along as it had been going

764

00:47:44,100 --> 00:47:48,133 and try to negotiate[19] some kind of face-saving settlement.

765

00:47:48,133 --> 00:47:53,066 Or they could use still more American military power

766

00:47:53,066 --> 00:47:56,733 to force the North to abandon its goal of uniting the country.

767

00:47:56,733 --> 00:48:01,066 Bundy and McNamara favored that option.

768

00:48:01,066 --> 00:48:04,033 Unless the president chose it, they said,

769

00:48:04,033 --> 00:48:06,033 South Vietnam would fall.

770

00:48:06,033 --> 00:48:09,800 "I don't think anything," Johnson told McNamara,

771

00:48:09,800 --> 00:48:12,600 "is going to be as bad as losing."

772

00:48:17,466 --> 00:48:20,066 Then, a little over a week later,

773

00:48:20,066 --> 00:48:23,700 guerrillas struck an American helicopter base at Pleiku

774

00:48:23,700 --> 00:48:25,566 in the Central Highlands,

775

00:48:25,566 --> 00:48:30,366 killing eight American advisors and wounding over 100 more.

776

00:48:30,366 --> 00:48:32,400 McNAMARA: Approximately 24 hours ago,

777

00:48:32,400 --> 00:48:34,900 the first attack in the Pleiku area...

778

00:48:34,900 --> 00:48:37,600 NARRATOR: Johnson immediately approved an air strike

779

00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:40,333 on a North Vietnamese army barracks.

780

00:48:41,566 --> 00:48:45,066 On February 10, 1965,

781

00:48:45,066 --> 00:48:48,333 the Viet Cong blew up a hotel in Qui Nhon,

782

00:48:48,333 --> 00:48:54,800 killing 23 Americans and pinning 21 more beneath the rubble.

783

00:48:54,800 --> 00:48:58,300 Johnson ordered another airstrike.

784

00:48:58,300 --> 00:49:01,866 Anxiety about what seemed to be happening

785

00:49:01,866 --> 00:49:04,466 spread around the world.

786

00:49:04,466 --> 00:49:07,400 France, which had spent nearly a century in Vietnam,

787

00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:11,766 now called for an end to all foreign involvement there.[20]

788

00:49:11,766 --> 00:49:15,400 The British prime minister urged restraint.

789

00:49:15,400 --> 00:49:19,133 Many leaders of the president's own party agreed,

790

00:49:19,133 --> 00:49:21,733 though not in public.

791

00:49:21,733 --> 00:49:23,900 In a private memorandum,

792

00:49:23,900 --> 00:49:26,600 Johnson's own vice president, Hubert Humphrey,

793

00:49:26,600 --> 00:49:30,000 warned him that widening the war would undercut

794

00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:34,733 the Great Society, damage America's image overseas,

795

00:49:34,733 --> 00:49:39,166 and end any hope of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

796

00:49:40,500 --> 00:49:42,900 Johnson never responded.

797

00:49:42,900 --> 00:49:46,033 Instead, on March 2, 1965,

798

00:49:46,033 --> 00:49:49,666 the United States began a systematic bombardment

799

00:49:49,666 --> 00:49:51,666 of targets in North Vietnam,

800

00:49:51,666 --> 00:49:55,600 code-named Operation Rolling Thunder.

801

00:49:57,600 --> 00:50:00,766 It was meant to be a "mounting crescendo" of air raids,

802

00:50:00,766 --> 00:50:02,366 Ambassador Taylor wrote,

803

00:50:02,366 --> 00:50:05,533 intended to bolster morale in the South

804

00:50:05,533 --> 00:50:10,333 and destroy morale in the North.

805

00:50:10,333 --> 00:50:13,400 WILSON: The thesis behind Rolling Thunder,

806

00:50:13,400 --> 00:50:19,100 as I understood it, was that as we ratcheted up the tempo

807

00:50:19,100 --> 00:50:23,766 and the volume of this effort against the North Vietnamese,

808

00:50:23,766 --> 00:50:26,700 sooner or later they would cry uncle.

809

00:50:29,366 --> 00:50:32,166 And there'd be a pause,

810

00:50:32,166 --> 00:50:36,833 and we would begin to negotiate[21] our way out of this situation.

MINUTES 50-60

811

00:50:36,833 --> 00:50:39,733 This became an article of faith.

812

00:50:39,733 --> 00:50:43,533 And this article of faith was a fallacious assumption.

813

00:50:43,533 --> 00:50:46,066 They weren't going to give up.

814

00:50:46,066 --> 00:50:50,433 They read us better than we read them.

815

00:50:50,433 --> 00:50:54,400 NARRATOR: The president insisted on strict secrecy--

816

00:50:54,400 --> 00:50:57,700 the American people were not to be told [22]

817

00:50:57,700 --> 00:51:01,166 that the administration had changed its policy

818

00:51:01,166 --> 00:51:05,100 from retaliatory airstrikes to systematic bombing;

819

00:51:05,100 --> 00:51:08,433 that he had, in fact, widened the war.

820

00:51:08,433 --> 00:51:12,166 They jointly agreed that joint retaliatory action

821

00:51:12,166 --> 00:51:13,766 was required.

822

00:51:13,766 --> 00:51:17,600 NARRATOR: General Westmoreland, who had initially been hesitant

823

00:51:17,600 --> 00:51:20,400 about committing ground troops to Vietnam,

824

00:51:20,400 --> 00:51:25,100 now asked for two battalions of Marines-- 3,500 men--

825

00:51:25,100 --> 00:51:27,533 to protect the Danang airbase

826

00:51:27,533 --> 00:51:31,100 from which fighter-bombers were hitting the North.

827

00:51:31,100 --> 00:51:35,133 Ambassador Taylor, who had once called for ground troops,

828

00:51:35,133 --> 00:51:37,833 now objected to the whole idea.

829

00:51:37,833 --> 00:51:41,366 "Once you put that first soldier ashore," he wrote,

830

00:51:41,366 --> 00:51:45,400 "you never know how many others are going to follow him."

831

00:51:45,400 --> 00:51:49,400 But the president felt he had no choice but to give Westmoreland

832

00:51:49,400 --> 00:51:51,533 what he asked for.

833

00:51:51,533 --> 00:51:56,500 He knew he would be blamed if more American advisors died.

834

00:51:56,500 --> 00:52:00,633 "I feel like a jackass caught in a Texas hailstorm,"

835

00:52:00,633 --> 00:52:02,233 he complained.

836

00:52:02,233 --> 00:52:07,466 "I can't run, I can't hide, and I can't make it stop."

837

00:52:07,466 --> 00:52:08,933 ("Hello Vietnam" by Johnnie Wright playing)

838

00:52:08,933 --> 00:52:10,933 In March of 1965,

839

00:52:10,933 --> 00:52:13,833 Johnson finally took the action he had managed to avoid

840

00:52:13,833 --> 00:52:16,000 for so long.

841

00:52:16,000 --> 00:52:18,333 WRIGHT: ♪ Kiss me goodbye...

842

00:52:18,333 --> 00:52:21,333 NARRATOR: He was putting American ground troops in Vietnam.

843

00:52:24,100 --> 00:52:29,733 WRIGHT: ♪ Goodbye, my sweetheart; hello, Vietnam ♪

844

00:52:29,733 --> 00:52:33,566 NARRATOR: The government of South Vietnam was not even consulted;

845

00:52:33,566 --> 00:52:38,033 the United States of America had larger considerations.

846

00:52:40,166 --> 00:52:44,666 ROBERT GARD: PENTAGON Clearly, we saw it in terms of the Cold War.

847

00:52:44,666 --> 00:52:48,833 Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton said...[23]

848

00:52:48,833 --> 00:52:50,766 He said our interests there

849

00:52:50,766 --> 00:52:55,900 were 70% to avoid humiliation,[24]

850

00:52:55,900 --> 00:52:59,733 20% to contain China,

851

00:52:59,733 --> 00:53:03,200 and ten percent to help the Vietnamese.

852

00:53:05,500 --> 00:53:08,266 NARRATOR: Johnson quietly told his good friend

853

00:53:08,266 --> 00:53:10,566 Senator Richard Russell of Georgia

854

00:53:10,566 --> 00:53:13,000 what was about to happen.

855

00:53:13,000 --> 00:53:15,800 JOHNSON: I guess we got no choice, but it scares the death out of me.

856

00:53:15,800 --> 00:53:17,166 I think everybody's going to think,

857

00:53:17,166 --> 00:53:18,733 "We're landing the Marines.

858

00:53:18,733 --> 00:53:20,500 We're off to battle."

859

00:53:20,500 --> 00:53:22,133 Of course, if they come up there,

860

00:53:22,133 --> 00:53:23,400 they're going to get them in a fight.

861

00:53:23,400 --> 00:53:24,833 And if they ruin those airplanes,

862

00:53:24,833 --> 00:53:26,900 everybody is going to give me hell for not securing them,

863

00:53:26,900 --> 00:53:28,733 just like they did last time they made a raid.

864

00:53:28,733 --> 00:53:30,133 RUSSELL: Yeah.

865

00:53:30,133 --> 00:53:31,433 JOHNSON: What do you... what do you think?

866

00:53:31,433 --> 00:53:33,200 RUSSELL: Well, Mr. President,

867

00:53:33,200 --> 00:53:34,366 it scares the life out of me.

868

00:53:34,366 --> 00:53:35,866 But I don't know how to back up now.

869

00:53:35,866 --> 00:53:38,166 It looks to me like we just got in this thing,

870

00:53:38,166 --> 00:53:39,366 and there's no way out.

871

00:53:39,366 --> 00:53:40,666 JOHNSON: I don't know.

872

00:53:40,666 --> 00:53:43,666 Dick, the great trouble I'm under...

873

00:53:43,666 --> 00:53:46,833 A man can fight if he can see daylight

874

00:53:46,833 --> 00:53:48,466 down the road somewhere.

875

00:53:48,466 --> 00:53:50,433 But there ain't no daylight in Vietnam.

876

00:53:50,433 --> 00:53:52,366 There's not a bit.

877

00:53:54,866 --> 00:53:58,800 NARRATOR: On March 8, 1965, Dr. Phan Huy Quat,

878

00:53:58,800 --> 00:54:02,000 yet another prime minister of South Vietnam,

879

00:54:02,000 --> 00:54:05,966 called his chief of staff, Bui Diem.

880

00:54:05,966 --> 00:54:07,500 BUI DIEM: S. VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT And Dr. Quat said, "There are three Marine battalions landing in Danang right now." I was flabbergasted. I said, "But why?" So he calmed me down. He said that, "No, okay. We talk about it later. But right now try to be brief and draft a communiqué, announcing the landing of three Marine battalions, and welcoming the landing in the same time." I was very unhappy.

881

00:54:39,666 --> 00:54:42,000 NARRATOR: The Marines were landing at Danang

882

00:54:42,000 --> 00:54:46,266 on the east coast of South Vietnam, some 100 miles south

883

00:54:46,266 --> 00:54:48,366 of the demilitarized zone

884

00:54:48,366 --> 00:54:51,500 that divided the North from the South.

885

00:54:51,500 --> 00:54:55,066 They were prepared to fight their way ashore.

886

00:54:55,066 --> 00:54:57,033 They did not need to.

887

00:54:58,733 --> 00:54:59,966 PHILIP CAPUTO: MARINES What struck me

888

00:54:59,966 --> 00:55:05,100 was how beautiful Vietnam was to look at.

889

00:55:07,100 --> 00:55:10,233 There were just these endless acres

890

00:55:10,233 --> 00:55:12,633 of these jade-green rice paddies.

891

00:55:12,633 --> 00:55:16,800 And these lovely villages inside these groves

892

00:55:16,800 --> 00:55:19,466 of bamboo and palm trees.

893

00:55:19,466 --> 00:55:24,666 And way off in the distance these bluish jungled mountains,

894

00:55:24,666 --> 00:55:27,900 and they looked like Shangri-La.

895

00:55:27,900 --> 00:55:32,100 And I remember seeing this line of Vietnamese women,

896

00:55:32,100 --> 00:55:34,000 or schoolgirls I think they were.

897

00:55:34,000 --> 00:55:37,233 They actually looked like angels come to earth

898

00:55:37,233 --> 00:55:38,633 or something like that.

899

00:55:38,633 --> 00:55:44,000 So it was really quite striking but a little unsettling

900

00:55:44,000 --> 00:55:45,166 because...

901

00:55:45,166 --> 00:55:46,800 so how can a place like this--

902

00:55:46,800 --> 00:55:50,200 so beautiful and so enchanting-- be at war?

903

00:55:51,600 --> 00:55:53,900 DUONG VAN MAI: My father was very happy.

904

00:55:53,900 --> 00:55:56,900 We're such a small and poor country

905

00:55:56,900 --> 00:56:01,533 and the Americans have decided to come in to save us

906

00:56:01,533 --> 00:56:05,166 not only with their money, their resources,

907

00:56:05,166 --> 00:56:08,133 but even with their own lives.

908

00:56:08,133 --> 00:56:10,033 We were very grateful.

909

00:56:10,033 --> 00:56:11,433 We thought the...

910

00:56:11,433 --> 00:56:14,433 sure enough with this power, the Americans are going to win.

911

00:56:14,433 --> 00:56:18,466 NARRATOR: Seeing foreign troops marching past his village,

912

00:56:18,466 --> 00:56:24,133 an old man emerged from his home shouting, "Vivent les Français!"

913

00:56:24,133 --> 00:56:27,233 He thought the French had returned.

914

00:56:28,600 --> 00:56:30,100 "The problem around here,"

915

00:56:30,100 --> 00:56:34,533 a Marine captain leading a patrol told a reporter,

916

00:56:34,533 --> 00:56:37,466 "is who the hell is who?"

917

00:56:37,466 --> 00:56:41,366 WILSON: As a voting member of Saigon Mission Council,

918

00:56:41,366 --> 00:56:45,833 I was opposed to the entry of American ground combat forces.

919

00:56:47,933 --> 00:56:52,300 I felt if the Vietnamese had to beat them off

920

00:56:52,300 --> 00:56:55,533 with a bloody stump, they had to do it themselves.

921

00:56:55,533 --> 00:56:59,700 We had to do everything we humanly could to help them,

922

00:56:59,700 --> 00:57:02,466 but we could not win it for them.

923

00:57:04,100 --> 00:57:08,100 So, I think we crossed the River Styx[25] at that point.

924

00:57:10,033 --> 00:57:13,500 TRAN NGOC TOAN: SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINES In the deep of every Vietnamese mind, foreigner is the invader. So when the American come in. The Viet Cong can recruit more people to fight against the invader.

925

00:57:35,366 --> 00:57:38,166 BILL ZIMMERMAN: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The first protest I went to against the war in Vietnam

926

00:57:38,166 --> 00:57:42,233 was a protest at a Dow Chemical facility.

927

00:57:45,266 --> 00:57:47,966 Dow was manufacturing napalm.

928

00:57:47,966 --> 00:57:51,100 They were dropping napalm on villages in Vietnam.

929

00:57:51,100 --> 00:57:53,733 It was a very disappointing experience

930

00:57:53,733 --> 00:57:56,833 because only 40 people came.

931

00:57:56,833 --> 00:57:59,533 And we seemed very out of place

932

00:57:59,533 --> 00:58:02,766 and very ineffectual, impotent,

933

00:58:02,766 --> 00:58:06,933 standing outside with 40 people.

934

00:58:06,933 --> 00:58:11,600 NARRATOR: Most Americans understood little about Indochina,

935

00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:15,333 rarely knew anyone actually involved in the fighting,

936

00:58:15,333 --> 00:58:18,733 saw no reason to question the government's assertion

937

00:58:18,733 --> 00:58:21,566 that the United States had vital interests

938

00:58:21,566 --> 00:58:24,266 8,000 miles from home.

939

00:58:24,266 --> 00:58:25,933 ("I Ain't Marching Anymore" by Phil Ochs playing)

940

00:58:25,933 --> 00:58:29,066 Still, there was a small but growing number of people

941

00:58:29,066 --> 00:58:33,033 who had begun to oppose the war for any number of reasons--

942

00:58:33,033 --> 00:58:37,566 because they thought it unjust or immoral,

943

00:58:37,566 --> 00:58:40,400 believed it was unconstitutional

944

00:58:40,400 --> 00:58:44,066 or simply not in the national interest.

945

00:58:44,066 --> 00:58:47,500 OCHS: ♪ Oh I marched to the battle of New Orleans ♪

946

00:58:47,500 --> 00:58:50,466 NARRATOR: Two weeks after the Marines landed at Danang,

947

00:58:50,466 --> 00:58:54,333 members of the University of Michigan faculty organized

948

00:58:54,333 --> 00:58:57,266 a night-long discussion between professors

949

00:58:57,266 --> 00:59:02,866 and some 3,000 students about the escalation of the war.

950

00:59:02,866 --> 00:59:04,633 REPORTER: The demonstration was called a teach-in

951

00:59:04,633 --> 00:59:06,466 because the idea originated

952

00:59:06,466 --> 00:59:08,266 with a group of university professors.

953

00:59:08,266 --> 00:59:11,633 What do you hope to accomplish?

954

00:59:11,633 --> 00:59:14,300 DR. ERIC WOLF: I'd like to open up communication between people

955

00:59:14,300 --> 00:59:16,566 and the government because I believe

956

00:59:16,566 --> 00:59:18,566 that they are not telling us what is going on,

957

00:59:18,566 --> 00:59:21,033 and the people have the right to know, and we have the right

958

00:59:21,033 --> 00:59:22,866 to tell the government what we think.

959

00:59:22,866 --> 00:59:27,933 NARRATOR: Soon, there were teach-ins on most major university campuses.

960

00:59:27,933 --> 00:59:31,233 There is no morally wonderful way out.

961

00:59:31,233 --> 00:59:36,266 NARRATOR: NYU in Manhattan, the University of Wisconsin in Madison,

962

00:59:36,266 --> 00:59:41,033 the University of California in Berkeley.

963

00:59:41,033 --> 00:59:44,266 The teach-ins were really raucous affairs.

964

00:59:44,266 --> 00:59:46,900 A lot of contention.

965

00:59:46,900 --> 00:59:48,333 STUDENT: We want to discuss

966

00:59:48,333 --> 00:59:51,233 is what's wrong with the Vietnam War, and...

967

00:59:51,233 --> 00:59:53,166 OCHS: ♪ And so many others

968

00:59:53,166 --> 00:59:54,866 ♪ But I ain't marchin' anymore

969

00:59:54,866 --> 00:59:56,366 REPORTER: Do you endorse

970

00:59:56,366 --> 00:59:58,366 the administration's policy in South Vietnam?

971

00:59:58,366 --> 01:00:00,066 MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Whole-heartedly.

972

01:00:00,066 --> 01:00:01,533 ZIMMERMAN: There were plenty of times

973

01:00:01,533 --> 01:00:03,533 when people who were supportive of the war

974

01:00:03,533 --> 01:00:04,966 came to these teach-ins

975

01:00:04,966 --> 01:00:08,100 to try to give an alternative anticommunist point of view.

976

01:00:08,100 --> 01:00:10,400 They were often shouted down.

977

01:00:10,400 --> 01:00:12,366 (crowd booing)

MINUTES 60-70

978

01:00:12,366 --> 01:00:16,333 NARRATOR: The bombing of the North and the Marines' arrival

979

01:00:16,333 --> 01:00:20,433 also drew protestors to Washington that spring.

980

01:00:20,433 --> 01:00:22,166 The demonstration was organized

981

01:00:22,166 --> 01:00:27,066 by the Students for a Democratic Society-- the SDS.

982

01:00:27,066 --> 01:00:31,966 BILL ZIMMERMAN: I saw SDS calling for a demonstration at the White House

983

01:00:31,966 --> 01:00:34,600 in the spring of 1965.

984

01:00:34,600 --> 01:00:37,766 I didn't want to go because I didn't want to be disappointed

985

01:00:37,766 --> 01:00:39,400 in the same way again and, you know,

986

01:00:39,400 --> 01:00:41,000 go all the way to Washington

987

01:00:41,000 --> 01:00:42,800 and stand outside the White House with 40 people.

988

01:00:42,800 --> 01:00:44,433 (crowd cheering)

989

01:00:44,433 --> 01:00:47,400 25,000 people attended that rally.

990

01:00:49,800 --> 01:00:51,833 And that suddenly told me

991

01:00:51,833 --> 01:00:55,366 and others I was working with at the time

992

01:00:55,366 --> 01:00:59,066 that it might be possible to build an antiwar movement.

993

01:01:03,666 --> 01:01:05,666 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: It was quite astounding to think

994

01:01:05,666 --> 01:01:08,500 that he had that degree of commitment.

995

01:01:08,500 --> 01:01:10,766 And it made sense

996

01:01:10,766 --> 01:01:16,100 in what we knew of him, as drastic as it was.

997

01:01:16,100 --> 01:01:17,600 ("It's My Life" by the Animals playing)

998

01:01:17,600 --> 01:01:20,266 NARRATOR: Nothing Mogie Crocker's parents could say or do

999

01:01:20,266 --> 01:01:22,333 since Mogie had come home

1000

01:01:22,333 --> 01:01:24,900 shook his determination to serve,

1001

01:01:24,900 --> 01:01:26,933 and recent developments in Vietnam

1002

01:01:26,933 --> 01:01:29,666 had only strengthened his resolve.

1003

01:01:29,666 --> 01:01:33,900 He wanted to become a paratrooper and get into combat.

1004

01:01:33,900 --> 01:01:36,466 His parents finally, reluctantly,

1005

01:01:36,466 --> 01:01:39,433 agreed to let him go, and on March 15,[26]

1006

01:01:39,433 --> 01:01:43,233 a week after the first Marines landed at Danang,

1007

01:01:43,233 --> 01:01:48,533 Denton Crocker, Jr. entered the United States Army.

1008

01:01:48,533 --> 01:01:51,866 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: So Denton bounced down the steps one morning

1009

01:01:51,866 --> 01:01:55,100 and was off to Fort Dix.

1010

01:01:55,100 --> 01:01:58,800 It was in a way a sort of relief, actually,

1011

01:01:58,800 --> 01:02:01,833 that the conflict and the anxiety

1012

01:02:01,833 --> 01:02:05,233 over whether he would or would not go was done.

1013

01:02:05,233 --> 01:02:06,700 And he was happy.

1014

01:02:06,700 --> 01:02:10,233 And we just tried to believe that this was the right thing

1015

01:02:10,233 --> 01:02:12,100 for him to do.

1016

01:02:19,566 --> 01:02:23,766 LE MINH KHUE: NORTH VIETNAM In the early days, I wasn't very scared. But when I saw dead people, that scared me. The Americans bombed a village for hours.[27] We ran over to see what had happened. The village was unrecognizable. From then on, I knew that war had arrived.

1017

01:03:02,433 --> 01:03:05,900 NARRATOR: Le Minh Khue was orphaned as a small girl,

1018

01:03:05,900 --> 01:03:08,933 her parents victims of the brutal land reforms

1019

01:03:08,933 --> 01:03:11,700 the communists had imposed.

1020

01:03:11,700 --> 01:03:14,300 She was raised by her aunt and uncle,

1021

01:03:14,300 --> 01:03:18,500 who encouraged her to read American literature.

1022

01:03:18,500 --> 01:03:23,333 She was 16 when Operation Rolling Thunder began.

1023

01:03:23,333 --> 01:03:28,000 LE MINH KHUE: My house was next to a home for the elderly. It was completely destroyed. Bombs fell on the market and the school. Then, a recruiter came, asking for volunteers. My head was full of a strong spirit of adventure. But I was too young. You had to be 17. So I lied about my age and signed up.

1024

01:03:58,600 --> 01:04:01,333 NARRATOR: Khue was assigned to an organization called

1025

01:04:01,333 --> 01:04:04,233 the "Youth Shock Brigades Against the Americans

1026

01:04:04,233 --> 01:04:06,266 for National Salvation,"

1027

01:04:06,266 --> 01:04:09,733 and along with thousands of other young people

1028

01:04:09,733 --> 01:04:13,966 was sent south to work keeping open the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

1029

01:04:16,166 --> 01:04:19,833 LE MINH KHUE: Before I left, my uncle said, "American literature is very unique. You should bring some with you." I've loved American literature ever since, and in particular, I love Hemingway. I learned from "For Whom the Bell Tolls."[28] Like the resourcefulness of the man who destroys the bridge. I saw how he coped with war and I learned from that character.

1030

01:04:53,566 --> 01:04:55,500 NARRATOR: As Johnson had feared,

1031

01:04:55,500 --> 01:04:59,333 it quickly became clear that the bombing campaign alone

1032

01:04:59,333 --> 01:05:01,100 was not working.

1033

01:05:01,100 --> 01:05:05,500 Troops and supplies continued steadily to filter down

1034

01:05:05,500 --> 01:05:07,800 the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

1035

01:05:07,800 --> 01:05:10,633 General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs

1036

01:05:10,633 --> 01:05:14,266 called for more men, tens of thousands of them.

1037

01:05:14,266 --> 01:05:17,600 The President was cautious.

1038

01:05:17,600 --> 01:05:20,433 He wanted to do "enough, but not too much," he said.

1039

01:05:20,433 --> 01:05:24,433 But he quietly agreed to send two more Marine battalions

1040

01:05:24,433 --> 01:05:30,066 and changed their mission from base security to active combat.

1041

01:05:30,066 --> 01:05:31,433 For the first time,

1042

01:05:31,433 --> 01:05:33,966 American troops were being asked

1043

01:05:33,966 --> 01:05:37,166 to fight on their own in Vietnam.

1044

01:05:37,166 --> 01:05:40,666 Johnson did not want that fact revealed

1045

01:05:40,666 --> 01:05:43,200 to the American public either.

1046

01:05:43,200 --> 01:05:45,033 But the bombing of the North

1047

01:05:45,033 --> 01:05:47,600 and rumors of harsher measures to come

1048

01:05:47,600 --> 01:05:51,033 had heightened concern around the world.

1049

01:05:51,033 --> 01:05:53,866 UN Secretary-General U Thant had proposed

1050

01:05:53,866 --> 01:05:56,200 a three-month ceasefire.

1051

01:05:56,200 --> 01:05:59,100 Great Britain, America's closest ally,

1052

01:05:59,100 --> 01:06:03,000 publicly offered to reconvene the Geneva Talks

1053

01:06:03,000 --> 01:06:06,033 that had divided Vietnam in 1954,

1054

01:06:06,033 --> 01:06:09,633 with the goal of reuniting it.[29]

1055

01:06:09,633 --> 01:06:12,866 JOHNSON: The people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide

1056

01:06:12,866 --> 01:06:14,300 their own country...

1057

01:06:14,300 --> 01:06:17,666 NARRATOR: On April 7, at Johns Hopkins University,

1058

01:06:17,666 --> 01:06:19,966 Johnson sought to persuade the world

1059

01:06:19,966 --> 01:06:22,333 of America's good intentions

1060

01:06:22,333 --> 01:06:26,766 and again to calm American fears of a wider war.

1061

01:06:28,366 --> 01:06:32,333 JOHNSON: In recent months, attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up.

1062

01:06:32,333 --> 01:06:37,300 Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response

1063

01:06:37,300 --> 01:06:40,533 and to make attacks by air.

1064

01:06:40,533 --> 01:06:44,233 This is not a change of purpose.

1065

01:06:44,233 --> 01:06:49,766 It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

1066

01:06:49,766 --> 01:06:53,666 NARRATOR: Nothing was said about the new orders sending Marines

1067

01:06:53,666 --> 01:06:56,333 directly into combat.

1068

01:06:56,333 --> 01:07:01,200 Instead, the president called for "unconditional discussions"

1069

01:07:01,200 --> 01:07:04,633 with Hanoi, and as an old New Dealer,

1070

01:07:04,633 --> 01:07:07,466 proposed a massive development program

1071

01:07:07,466 --> 01:07:09,533 for all of Southeast Asia. [30]

1072

01:07:09,533 --> 01:07:12,266 JOHNSON: The vast Mekong River can provide

1073

01:07:12,266 --> 01:07:13,933 food and water and power

1074

01:07:13,933 --> 01:07:17,533 on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA.

1075

01:07:17,533 --> 01:07:19,600 (gunfire)

1076

01:07:19,600 --> 01:07:21,833 BRADY: I was outside of the village.

1077

01:07:21,833 --> 01:07:24,200 We're getting some fire from the village.

1078

01:07:24,200 --> 01:07:26,600 I had the little transistor radio.

1079

01:07:26,600 --> 01:07:29,766 And I'm sitting there listening to LBJ.

1080

01:07:29,766 --> 01:07:31,733 JOHNSON: ...will use our power with restraint

1081

01:07:31,733 --> 01:07:33,833 and with all the wisdom...

1082

01:07:33,833 --> 01:07:37,366 BRADY: At the same time we got to lay some nape on the village.

1083

01:07:37,366 --> 01:07:39,266 So I'm calling in the nape

1084

01:07:39,266 --> 01:07:42,700 and listening to the president talk peace.

1085

01:07:42,700 --> 01:07:45,833 JOHNSON: We will try to keep conflict from spreading.

1086

01:07:45,833 --> 01:07:48,633 BRADY: It was surreal.

1087

01:07:48,633 --> 01:07:50,766 JOHNSON: We have no desire to devastate

1088

01:07:50,766 --> 01:07:55,066 that which the people of North Vietnam have built

1089

01:07:55,066 --> 01:07:58,333 with toil and sacrifice.

1090

01:07:58,333 --> 01:08:04,533 This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony.

1091

01:08:04,533 --> 01:08:06,333 What do the people of North Vietnam want?

1092

01:08:06,333 --> 01:08:07,800 (sirens wailing)

1093

01:08:11,233 --> 01:08:15,400 NARRATOR: Hanoi denounced the president's offer as a trick.

1094

01:08:15,400 --> 01:08:18,500 Johnson's advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1095

01:08:18,500 --> 01:08:22,700 continued to debate how many men would actually be needed

1096

01:08:22,700 --> 01:08:26,200 and how rapidly they should be deployed.

1097

01:08:26,200 --> 01:08:30,666 Meanwhile, the president sent the first Army combat troops

1098

01:08:30,666 --> 01:08:31,966 to the country.

1099

01:08:31,966 --> 01:08:34,266 It was increasingly clear

1100

01:08:34,266 --> 01:08:38,066 that the United States was in it for the long haul.

1101

01:08:41,866 --> 01:08:49,100 JOE GALLOWAY: JOURNALIST You can't just be a neutral witness to something like war.

1102

01:08:56,833 --> 01:09:00,899 It crawls down your throat.

1103

01:09:00,899 --> 01:09:06,100 It eats you alive from the inside and the out.

1104

01:09:10,500 --> 01:09:15,266 It's not something that you can stand back and be neutral

1105

01:09:15,266 --> 01:09:21,633 and objective and all of those things we try to be

1106

01:09:21,633 --> 01:09:25,166 as reporters, journalists, photographers.

1107

01:09:27,833 --> 01:09:30,566 It doesn't work that way.

1108

01:09:33,100 --> 01:09:37,233 MAN (on radio): ...defense and they're real quick... and check it out...

1109

01:09:37,233 --> 01:09:40,966 NARRATOR: The growing presence of American combat troops in Vietnam

1110

01:09:40,966 --> 01:09:45,033 attracted flocks of journalists.

1111

01:09:45,033 --> 01:09:47,233 There was no press censorship,

1112

01:09:47,233 --> 01:09:50,666 as there had been in World War II.

1113

01:09:50,666 --> 01:09:55,066 Reporters just had to agree to follow military guidelines

1114

01:09:55,066 --> 01:09:57,500 so as not to compromise the security

1115

01:09:57,500 --> 01:09:59,866 of ongoing operations.

1116

01:09:59,866 --> 01:10:02,266 It was dangerous work.

1117

01:10:02,266 --> 01:10:06,733 More than 200 journalists and photographers would die

1118

01:10:06,733 --> 01:10:09,933 covering the fighting in Southeast Asia.

1119

01:10:09,933 --> 01:10:13,300 Joseph Lee Galloway was a young UPI reporter

1120

01:10:13,300 --> 01:10:16,700 from Refugio, Texas.

1121

01:10:16,700 --> 01:10:20,533 He stopped in Saigon just long enough to get his credentials.

1122

01:10:20,533 --> 01:10:23,633 Then he headed for Danang.

MINUTES 70-80

1123

01:10:23,633 --> 01:10:27,000 GALLOWAY: The Marines originally came ashore there

1124

01:10:27,000 --> 01:10:29,633 to guard the airbase.

1125

01:10:29,633 --> 01:10:35,733 And they quickly figured out you can't just guard an airbase.

1126

01:10:35,733 --> 01:10:37,566 You've got to spread out

1127

01:10:37,566 --> 01:10:38,966 because they're going to mortar it,

1128

01:10:38,966 --> 01:10:40,833 they're going to shoot rockets.

1129

01:10:40,833 --> 01:10:44,633 So you've got to reach out 15 or 20 miles.

1130

01:10:44,633 --> 01:10:48,666 That means you've got to run operations that far out.

1131

01:10:48,666 --> 01:10:50,233 And once you're doing that,

1132

01:10:50,233 --> 01:10:52,633 you're no longer guarding an airbase...

1133

01:10:52,633 --> 01:10:54,366 (gunfire)

1134

01:10:54,366 --> 01:10:57,566 ...you're operating in hostile territory.

1135

01:11:00,900 --> 01:11:02,500 (soldiers cheering)

1136

01:11:06,733 --> 01:11:09,166 NGUYEN THANH SON: NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY No matter how strong you are, if you aren't familiar with the battlefield, with the climate, with the local customs, it will be very tough. The Americans were very tall and slow. They weren's as quick as our soldiers.

1137

01:11:28,200 --> 01:11:32,600 CAPUTO: MARINES It wasn't so much the Viet Cong that were intimidating

1138

01:11:32,600 --> 01:11:35,966 at that point as it was the terrain.

1139

01:11:35,966 --> 01:11:40,700 Going from Point A to Point B in the jungle

1140

01:11:40,700 --> 01:11:42,100 was so difficult.

1141

01:11:42,100 --> 01:11:46,566 As it happened to me once, it took four hours

1142

01:11:46,566 --> 01:11:48,766 to move a half a mile,

1143

01:11:48,766 --> 01:11:51,966 cutting through this bush with machetes.

1144

01:11:54,233 --> 01:12:00,166 GALLOWAY: The Viet Cong knew the terrain far better than the Marines did,

1145

01:12:00,166 --> 01:12:04,033 and ran circles around them.

1146

01:12:04,033 --> 01:12:06,466 (gunfire)

1147

01:12:16,233 --> 01:12:21,700 MOGIE CROCKER (dramatized): Fort Dix, June 10, 1965.

1148

01:12:21,700 --> 01:12:23,366 Dear Mum,

1149

01:12:23,366 --> 01:12:27,433 Basic is now all over and I am presently waiting for orders.

1150

01:12:27,433 --> 01:12:29,733 Waiting for orders could be very dull

1151

01:12:29,733 --> 01:12:31,566 but I have found there are excellent chances

1152

01:12:31,566 --> 01:12:33,400 to do some reading.

1153

01:12:33,400 --> 01:12:35,666 Recently I have read Wuthering Heights,

1154

01:12:35,666 --> 01:12:40,466 Animal Farm, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and Lord Jim.

1155

01:12:40,466 --> 01:12:42,266 I hope you are all well.

1156

01:12:42,266 --> 01:12:43,766 Love, Mogie.

1157

01:12:45,566 --> 01:12:48,300 NARRATOR: Mogie Crocker was allowed two weeks at home

1158

01:12:48,300 --> 01:12:51,100 before shipping out to Vietnam.

1159

01:12:52,966 --> 01:12:54,766 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: We were at dinner one evening

1160

01:12:54,766 --> 01:12:58,133 just talking, I guess, in generalities about the war

1161

01:12:58,133 --> 01:13:00,466 and the general situation.

1162

01:13:00,466 --> 01:13:05,333 And Mogie said, "Of course if I were a Vietnamese,

1163

01:13:05,333 --> 01:13:08,233 I would be on the side of the Viet Cong."

1164

01:13:08,233 --> 01:13:12,066 That... I puzzled over that.

1165

01:13:12,066 --> 01:13:15,500 I suppose relating like to our American Revolution

1166

01:13:15,500 --> 01:13:19,066 that he saw their need for their own freedom.

1167

01:13:19,066 --> 01:13:21,333 But as an American citizen,

1168

01:13:21,333 --> 01:13:26,333 he saw the larger picture of trying to prevent communism.

1169

01:13:26,333 --> 01:13:29,166 CAROL CROCKER: I remember one night in particular

1170

01:13:29,166 --> 01:13:30,933 he and I were up late.

1171

01:13:30,933 --> 01:13:36,100 And he suddenly leaned his head in his hands.

1172

01:13:36,100 --> 01:13:39,233 And he said, "I don't want to go back."

1173

01:13:40,400 --> 01:13:42,833 I was dumbstruck.

1174

01:13:42,833 --> 01:13:48,533 And said to him, "But this is what you want to do."

1175

01:13:48,533 --> 01:13:52,066 It had never occurred to me that he was torn about this,

1176

01:13:52,066 --> 01:13:55,466 that he was afraid and yet was determined to go.

1177

01:14:03,666 --> 01:14:06,166 ("Play With Fire" by the Rolling Stones playing)

1178

01:14:06,166 --> 01:14:09,933 NARRATOR: In South Vietnam, things were steadily growing worse.

1179

01:14:12,033 --> 01:14:14,633 JAGGER: ♪ Well, you've got your diamond. ♪

1180

01:14:14,633 --> 01:14:17,800 NARRATOR: In May, the Viet Cong,

1181

01:14:17,800 --> 01:14:21,600 supported now by four regiments of North Vietnamese regulars--

1182

01:14:21,600 --> 01:14:24,200 approximately 5,000 men--

1183

01:14:24,200 --> 01:14:28,133 were destroying the equivalent of a South Vietnamese battalion

1184

01:14:28,133 --> 01:14:29,966 every week.

1185

01:14:29,966 --> 01:14:31,900 JAGGER: ♪ But don't play with me

1186

01:14:31,900 --> 01:14:34,166 ♪ Because you're playing with fire. ♪

1187

01:14:34,166 --> 01:14:39,266 NARRATOR: South Vietnam now seemed only weeks from complete collapse.

1188

01:14:39,266 --> 01:14:42,966 Desperate, General Westmoreland requested

1189

01:14:42,966 --> 01:14:48,033 tens of thousands of more American troops right away.

1190

01:14:48,033 --> 01:14:50,866 But neither the continuing bombing

1191

01:14:50,866 --> 01:14:54,600 nor the growing likelihood of full-scale American intervention

1192

01:14:54,600 --> 01:14:58,000 seemed to intimidate Hanoi.

1193

01:14:58,000 --> 01:15:01,033 Le Duan, having failed to win the war

1194

01:15:01,033 --> 01:15:03,833 before the United States sent in ground troops,

1195

01:15:03,833 --> 01:15:07,100 was now persuaded the American public,

1196

01:15:07,100 --> 01:15:10,633 like the French public before them, would eventually weary

1197

01:15:10,633 --> 01:15:16,366 of a costly, bloody war being waged so far from home.

1198

01:15:16,366 --> 01:15:21,533 By contrast, he said, "The North will not count the cost."

1199

01:15:21,533 --> 01:15:24,200 Le Duan's confidence was bolstered

1200

01:15:24,200 --> 01:15:26,933 by the help American intervention had forced

1201

01:15:26,933 --> 01:15:30,600 the Soviet Union and China to offer him.

1202

01:15:30,600 --> 01:15:34,866 Moscow agreed to supply vast amounts of modern weaponry

1203

01:15:34,866 --> 01:15:36,333 and materiel.

1204

01:15:36,333 --> 01:15:41,233 Hanoi would eventually become the most heavily defended city

1205

01:15:41,233 --> 01:15:42,600 on Earth.

1206

01:15:42,600 --> 01:15:45,833 And China agreed to send support troops,

1207

01:15:45,833 --> 01:15:49,166 freeing North Vietnamese soldiers for combat

1208

01:15:49,166 --> 01:15:50,833 in the South.

1209

01:15:50,833 --> 01:15:56,066 320,000 Chinese would eventually serve behind the lines

1210

01:15:56,066 --> 01:15:59,266 in the North.

1211

01:15:59,266 --> 01:16:01,533 "We will fight," Le Duan promised,

1212

01:16:01,533 --> 01:16:04,800 "whatever way the United States wants."

1213

01:16:05,966 --> 01:16:09,300 JOHN NEGROPONTE: U.S. EMBASSY In June of 1965,

1214

01:16:09,300 --> 01:16:11,866 Secretary McNamara, the Secretary of Defense,

1215

01:16:11,866 --> 01:16:13,266 came out to Saigon.

1216

01:16:13,266 --> 01:16:16,900 There were a lot of captains and majors and lieutenants.

1217

01:16:16,900 --> 01:16:20,966 And every person said to Mr. McNamara,

1218

01:16:20,966 --> 01:16:23,466 "The situation is so dire

1219

01:16:23,466 --> 01:16:26,266 we must bring in United States forces."

1220

01:16:26,266 --> 01:16:29,333 So, whatever doubts we may have had,

1221

01:16:29,333 --> 01:16:31,233 whatever people may say after the fact,

1222

01:16:31,233 --> 01:16:34,133 I recall distinctly at the time

1223

01:16:34,133 --> 01:16:37,033 telling the Secretary of Defense that I thought we needed

1224

01:16:37,033 --> 01:16:38,100 to bring troops in there.

1225

01:16:39,400 --> 01:16:40,866 NARRATOR: For three weeks,

1226

01:16:40,866 --> 01:16:44,200 the President and his advisors argued over how to respond

1227

01:16:44,200 --> 01:16:47,933 to Westmoreland's urgent request for more troops,

1228

01:16:47,933 --> 01:16:52,600 differing mostly over how many should be sent how fast.

1229

01:16:52,600 --> 01:16:57,133 Undersecretary of State George Ball made the argument

1230

01:16:57,133 --> 01:16:59,900 against further escalation.

1231

01:16:59,900 --> 01:17:04,033 He told the president the war could not be won.

1232

01:17:04,033 --> 01:17:07,166 The American people will grow weary of it.

1233

01:17:07,166 --> 01:17:09,333 Our troops will get bogged down

1234

01:17:09,333 --> 01:17:11,866 "in the jungles and rice paddies," he warned,

1235

01:17:11,866 --> 01:17:15,533 "while we slowly blow the country to pieces."

1236

01:17:15,533 --> 01:17:18,000 No one else agreed.

1237

01:17:18,000 --> 01:17:21,233 JAGGER: ♪ But don't play with me...

1238

01:17:21,233 --> 01:17:26,866 NARRATOR: In the end, Johnson sent Westmoreland 50,000 men.

1239

01:17:26,866 --> 01:17:32,400 But he pledged another 50,000 by the end of 1965,

1240

01:17:32,400 --> 01:17:35,433 and still more if they were needed.

1241

01:17:35,433 --> 01:17:37,800 JAGGER: ♪ Because you're playing with fire. ♪

1242

01:17:39,533 --> 01:17:43,500 SOLDIERS: ♪ Gory, gory, what a hell of a way to die ♪

1243

01:17:43,500 --> 01:17:46,900 TRAN NGOC TOAN: SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINES When the Americans come in 1965 everything mess up in South Vietnam. Nobody know about the country, the people, the ground they fought. I thinks it' a, it's a big mistake.

1244

01:18:12,066 --> 01:18:13,900 MAN: Hold your fire!

1245

01:18:13,900 --> 01:18:15,033 Hold your fire.

1246

01:18:16,233 --> 01:18:18,000 JOHN SCALI: Does the fact

1247

01:18:18,000 --> 01:18:21,033 that you are sending additional forces to Vietnam

1248

01:18:21,033 --> 01:18:24,066 imply any change in the existing policy

1249

01:18:24,066 --> 01:18:27,800 of using American forces to guard American installations

1250

01:18:27,800 --> 01:18:30,066 and to act as an emergency backup?

1251

01:18:30,066 --> 01:18:33,366 JOHNSON: It does not imply any change in policy whatever.

1252

01:18:33,366 --> 01:18:36,466 It does not imply any change of objective.

1253

01:18:36,466 --> 01:18:37,566 Uh...

1254

01:18:39,766 --> 01:18:41,700 LOU CIOFFI: The month of June saw soldiers here

1255

01:18:41,700 --> 01:18:43,000 taking what appears to be...

1256

01:18:43,000 --> 01:18:45,633 NARRATOR: Most television reports from Vietnam

1257

01:18:45,633 --> 01:18:49,066 echoed the newsreels Americans had flocked to see

1258

01:18:49,066 --> 01:18:53,500 during the Second World War-- enthusiastic, unquestioning,

1259

01:18:53,500 --> 01:18:58,433 good guys fighting and defeating bad guys.

1260

01:18:58,433 --> 01:19:03,000 But at dinnertime on August 5, 1965,

1261

01:19:03,000 --> 01:19:05,800 Americans saw another side of the war.

1262

01:19:07,433 --> 01:19:10,133 MORLEY SAFER: We're on the outskirts of the village of Cam Ne

1263

01:19:10,133 --> 01:19:12,000 with elements of the 1st Battalion...

1264

01:19:12,000 --> 01:19:15,566 NARRATOR: CBS correspondent Morley Safer and his crew

1265

01:19:15,566 --> 01:19:18,900 went on patrol with Marines near Danang.

1266

01:19:18,900 --> 01:19:22,100 Their orders were first to search a cluster

1267

01:19:22,100 --> 01:19:26,100 of four villages for caches of arms and rice

1268

01:19:26,100 --> 01:19:31,000 meant for the enemy and then to destroy them all.

1269

01:19:34,400 --> 01:19:37,533 MORLEY SAFER: [31] This is what the war in Vietnam is all about.

1270

01:19:37,533 --> 01:19:41,233 (speaking Vietnamese) [32]

1271

01:19:41,233 --> 01:19:44,766 The old and the very young.

1272

01:19:44,766 --> 01:19:47,633 The Marines have burned

1273

01:19:47,633 --> 01:19:49,633 this old couple's cottage

1274

01:19:49,633 --> 01:19:51,500 because fire was coming from here.

1275

01:19:51,500 --> 01:19:53,233 And now when you walk into the village

1276

01:19:53,233 --> 01:19:55,000 you see no young people at all.

1277

01:19:55,000 --> 01:19:59,633 (woman speaking Vietnamese)

1278

01:19:59,633 --> 01:20:02,900 The day's operation burned down 150 houses,

1279

01:20:02,900 --> 01:20:06,266 wounded three women, killed one baby,

1280

01:20:06,266 --> 01:20:11,800 wounded one Marine, and netted these four prisoners.

1281

01:20:11,800 --> 01:20:14,866 Today's operation is the frustration of Vietnam

1282

01:20:14,866 --> 01:20:16,766 in miniature.

1283

01:20:16,766 --> 01:20:19,200 There is little doubt that American firepower

1284

01:20:19,200 --> 01:20:21,533 can win a military victory here.

1285

01:20:21,533 --> 01:20:26,400 But to a Vietnamese peasant whose home is a...

1286

01:20:26,400 --> 01:20:28,800 means a lifetime of backbreaking labor,

1287

01:20:28,800 --> 01:20:31,700 it will take more than presidential promises

1288

01:20:31,700 --> 01:20:34,566 to convince him that we are on his side.

MINUTES 80-90

1289

01:20:36,300 --> 01:20:38,266 NARRATOR: The next morning, the president called

1290

01:20:38,266 --> 01:20:42,533 his friend Frank Stanton, the head of CBS.

1291

01:20:42,533 --> 01:20:45,800 "Hello, Frank, this is your president.

1292

01:20:45,800 --> 01:20:47,966 Are you trying to ... me?"

1293

01:20:49,400 --> 01:20:52,866 Safer had defaced the American flag, Johnson said.

1294

01:20:52,866 --> 01:20:57,266 He was probably an agent of the Kremlin, had to be fired.

1295

01:20:57,266 --> 01:21:01,600 The Marines claimed Safer had provided a zippo lighter

1296

01:21:01,600 --> 01:21:05,466 and asked the Marines to burn the hut for the camera.

1297

01:21:05,466 --> 01:21:07,866 A major at the Danang Marine press office

1298

01:21:07,866 --> 01:21:11,900 called CBS the "Communist Broadcasting System."

1299

01:21:13,066 --> 01:21:14,566 But after the operation,

1300

01:21:14,566 --> 01:21:19,933 Safer interviewed some of the Marines who'd burned Cam Ne.

1301

01:21:19,933 --> 01:21:22,266 SAFER: Do you ever have any private thoughts,

1302

01:21:22,266 --> 01:21:24,866 any private regrets about some of these people

1303

01:21:24,866 --> 01:21:26,266 you are leaving homeless?

1304

01:21:26,266 --> 01:21:27,600 SOLDIER: I feel no remorse.

1305

01:21:27,600 --> 01:21:28,800 I don't imagine anybody else does.

1306

01:21:28,800 --> 01:21:30,100 You can't expect to do your job

1307

01:21:30,100 --> 01:21:31,500 and feel pity for these people.

1308

01:21:33,600 --> 01:21:36,000 NARRATOR: When some viewers registered their shock,

1309

01:21:36,000 --> 01:21:40,133 Westmoreland admitted, "We have a genuine problem

1310

01:21:40,133 --> 01:21:44,100 "which will be with us as long as we are in Vietnam.

1311

01:21:44,100 --> 01:21:49,266 "Commanders must exercise restraint unnatural to war

1312

01:21:49,266 --> 01:21:53,133 and judgment not often required of young men."

1313

01:21:57,266 --> 01:22:00,100 CAPUTO: You kind of thought at first

1314

01:22:00,100 --> 01:22:02,900 that it was going to be like the GIs, you know,

1315

01:22:02,900 --> 01:22:05,533 rolling through Paris after the liberation.

1316

01:22:07,666 --> 01:22:10,433 Well, you know, it sure didn't work out that way.

1317

01:22:12,566 --> 01:22:14,900 I can remember once going in this one ville.

1318

01:22:14,900 --> 01:22:18,266 And I remember finding this entire Vietnamese family

1319

01:22:18,266 --> 01:22:21,033 cowering in a bunker.

1320

01:22:22,366 --> 01:22:24,700 And they were terrified of us.

1321

01:22:28,433 --> 01:22:31,100 And I remember thinking to myself, I said,

1322

01:22:31,100 --> 01:22:35,366 "Well, I wonder if back in the colonial days,

1323

01:22:35,366 --> 01:22:38,566 "when the Redcoats barged into Ipswich, Massachusetts,

1324

01:22:38,566 --> 01:22:39,700 "or wherever,

1325

01:22:39,700 --> 01:22:43,333 "if this is how Americans must have felt

1326

01:22:43,333 --> 01:22:47,000 looking at these foreign soldiers coming in here."

1327

01:22:47,000 --> 01:22:48,300 FREDERICK ACKERSON: The Viet Cong

1328

01:22:48,300 --> 01:22:53,700 have terrorized you, and have burned your homes.

1329

01:22:53,700 --> 01:22:56,833 We are here to help you.

1330

01:22:56,833 --> 01:23:01,266 To show how much we are able to protect you,

1331

01:23:01,266 --> 01:23:06,600 we are going to have the Air Force

1332

01:23:06,600 --> 01:23:11,866 hit some Viet Cong on the other side of the valley.

1333

01:23:11,866 --> 01:23:13,833 That will be at 10:30.

1334

01:23:13,833 --> 01:23:19,066 (playing "Colonel Bogey" march)

1335

01:23:19,066 --> 01:23:22,133 (distant explosion) [33]

1336

01:23:36,800 --> 01:23:38,966 MOGIE CROCKER (dramatized): Dear Mum and Dad,

1337

01:23:38,966 --> 01:23:42,066 I am now with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

1338

01:23:42,066 --> 01:23:43,966 in Vietnam.

1339

01:23:43,966 --> 01:23:46,800 ("The War Drags On" by Donovan playing)

1340

01:23:49,966 --> 01:23:51,900 What is taking place in America?

1341

01:23:51,900 --> 01:23:54,800 We who are in Vietnam find these protests

1342

01:23:54,800 --> 01:23:56,566 very hard to comprehend,

1343

01:23:56,566 --> 01:24:00,266 and many people here are quite bitter about them.

1344

01:24:00,266 --> 01:24:03,800 DONOVAN: ♪ Let me tell you the story in South Vietnam. ♪

1345

01:24:03,800 --> 01:24:05,466 MOGIE CROCKER (dramatized): The belief I have in our present policy

1346

01:24:05,466 --> 01:24:09,433 has been completely confirmed by what I have seen here.

1347

01:24:09,433 --> 01:24:12,566 My chief worry is that these pacifist bleatings

1348

01:24:12,566 --> 01:24:15,566 might effect even a small change in government policy

1349

01:24:15,566 --> 01:24:18,333 at a time when we appear close to success.

1350

01:24:18,333 --> 01:24:22,933 DONOVAN: ♪ And the war drags on.

1351

01:24:25,066 --> 01:24:29,466 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: As Vietnam began to be more and more chaotic,

1352

01:24:29,466 --> 01:24:34,233 I certainly wondered very much whether we should be there.

1353

01:24:34,233 --> 01:24:36,733 But I never expressed that to him.

1354

01:24:36,733 --> 01:24:40,200 That's one of those conflicts that's just too difficult

1355

01:24:40,200 --> 01:24:42,800 to bring up, or at least it was for me.

1356

01:24:44,400 --> 01:24:47,600 ("Big River" by Johnny Cash playing)

1357

01:24:49,100 --> 01:24:54,833 CASH: ♪ Now I taught the weeping willow how to cry ♪

1358

01:24:54,833 --> 01:24:59,833 ♪ And I showed the clouds how to cover up a clear blue sky. ♪

1359

01:24:59,833 --> 01:25:01,933 GALLOWAY: We were all excited about the arrival

1360

01:25:01,933 --> 01:25:06,666 of the 1st Cavalry Division, an experimental unit.

1361

01:25:06,666 --> 01:25:11,000 They've been trained in air-mobile warfare

1362

01:25:11,000 --> 01:25:17,700 using these helicopters to the absolute maximum benefit.

1363

01:25:17,700 --> 01:25:23,766 They're moving their artillery by helicopter, jumping it,

1364

01:25:23,766 --> 01:25:28,733 leapfrogging troops, chasing the enemy, driving him crazy.

1365

01:25:31,033 --> 01:25:33,133 This is something new,

1366

01:25:33,133 --> 01:25:36,900 and it's going to change the way we do war.

1367

01:25:36,900 --> 01:25:39,666 CASH: ♪ I found her trail in Memphis... ♪

1368

01:25:39,666 --> 01:25:42,300 NARRATOR: In September of 1965,

1369

01:25:42,300 --> 01:25:45,000 the newly created 1st Cavalry Division--

1370

01:25:45,000 --> 01:25:53,400 16,000 men, 1,600 vehicles, 435 helicopters--

1371

01:25:53,400 --> 01:25:58,333 had begun arriving at An Khe, a massive base carved out

1372

01:25:58,333 --> 01:26:01,266 of the grasslands at the edge of the Central Highlands.

1373

01:26:02,800 --> 01:26:06,133 Its heliport would come to be called the "Golf Course."

1374

01:26:09,800 --> 01:26:13,433 As the 1st Cavalry got used to its new surroundings,

1375

01:26:13,433 --> 01:26:17,333 thousands of North Vietnamese regulars were slipping south

1376

01:26:17,333 --> 01:26:20,800 into the Highlands along the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

1377

01:26:20,800 --> 01:26:24,300 joining Viet Cong units already in place.

1378

01:26:24,300 --> 01:26:27,800 They established their own base on and around

1379

01:26:27,800 --> 01:26:31,166 a jumble of thickly forested mountains and ravines

1380

01:26:31,166 --> 01:26:34,000 south of the Ia Drang River.

1381

01:26:34,000 --> 01:26:36,666 On the evening of October 19,

1382

01:26:36,666 --> 01:26:39,933 communist commandos slipped to within 40 yards

1383

01:26:39,933 --> 01:26:43,533 of the perimeter wire of the U.S. Special Forces outpost

1384

01:26:43,533 --> 01:26:45,000 at Plei Me,

1385

01:26:45,000 --> 01:26:49,766 which was defended by a 12-man team of U.S. Green Berets,

1386

01:26:49,766 --> 01:26:55,566 14 ARVN, and some 400 mountain tribesmen.

1387

01:27:01,700 --> 01:27:04,500 Nine of the 12 Green Berets were hit.

1388

01:27:04,500 --> 01:27:07,333 They managed to hold out for two days

1389

01:27:07,333 --> 01:27:13,833 before 15 more Green Berets and 160 South Vietnamese Rangers

1390

01:27:13,833 --> 01:27:18,500 were helicoptered in, commanded by Major Charles Beckwith,

1391

01:27:18,500 --> 01:27:22,633 known to his fellow soldiers as Chargin' Charlie.

1392

01:27:22,633 --> 01:27:23,633 (explosion)

1393

01:27:23,633 --> 01:27:25,066 The next day,

1394

01:27:25,066 --> 01:27:27,800 Joe Galloway managed to talk a helicopter pilot

1395

01:27:27,800 --> 01:27:31,300 into flying him into the besieged camp.

1396

01:27:31,300 --> 01:27:36,200 GALLOWAY: That's where I met Major Charles Beckwith.

1397

01:27:36,200 --> 01:27:39,666 He said, "I need everything in the world.

1398

01:27:39,666 --> 01:27:43,633 "And what has the Army in its wisdom sent me

1399

01:27:43,633 --> 01:27:46,833 but a godforsaken reporter?"

1400

01:27:46,833 --> 01:27:49,966 He drug me over and showed me

1401

01:27:49,966 --> 01:27:53,766 a 30-caliber air-cooled machine gun.

1402

01:27:53,766 --> 01:27:56,500 He showed me how to load it, how to clear a jam.

1403

01:27:56,500 --> 01:28:00,666 NARRATOR: "You can shoot the little brown men outside the wire,"

1404

01:28:00,666 --> 01:28:02,666 Beckwith told Galloway.

1405

01:28:02,666 --> 01:28:04,700 "You may not shoot the little brown men

1406

01:28:04,700 --> 01:28:08,400 inside the wire; they are mine."

1407

01:28:08,400 --> 01:28:10,300 GALLOWAY: And I'm sitting there thinking,

1408

01:28:10,300 --> 01:28:13,233 "Ah, I'm a civilian noncombatant."

1409

01:28:13,233 --> 01:28:16,600 I tried that line on Beckwith and he said,

1410

01:28:16,600 --> 01:28:19,533 "Ain't no such thing in these mountains, son."

1411

01:28:19,533 --> 01:28:23,733 NARRATOR: For nearly a week, the North Vietnamese launched assault

1412

01:28:23,733 --> 01:28:26,466 after assault on Plei Me.

1413

01:28:26,466 --> 01:28:30,766 It was only after American bombs and napalm

1414

01:28:30,766 --> 01:28:33,966 turned the surrounding terrain into a moonscape

1415

01:28:33,966 --> 01:28:37,133 that the enemy withdrew.

1416

01:28:37,133 --> 01:28:40,900 JOHN LAURENCE: What kind of fighters are the Viet Cong that you met here?

1417

01:28:43,300 --> 01:28:46,966 BECKWITH: I would give anything to have 200 of them under my command.

1418

01:28:46,966 --> 01:28:48,966 They're the finest soldiers I've ever seen.

1419

01:28:48,966 --> 01:28:50,266 LAURENCE: The Viet Cong.

1420

01:28:50,266 --> 01:28:51,666 BECKWITH: That's right.

1421

01:28:51,666 --> 01:28:53,366 They're dedicated, and they're good soldiers.

1422

01:28:53,366 --> 01:28:54,800 They're the best I've ever seen.

1423

01:28:57,766 --> 01:29:00,900 NARRATOR: Despite the losses his men had suffered at Plei Me,

1424

01:29:00,900 --> 01:29:04,400 the North Vietnamese commander, General Chu Huy Man,

1425

01:29:04,400 --> 01:29:06,400 was eager for another confrontation

1426

01:29:06,400 --> 01:29:08,266 with the Americans.

1427

01:29:08,266 --> 01:29:11,833 He was determined to learn how to fight them.

1428

01:29:11,833 --> 01:29:15,233 Reinforcements streaming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail

1429

01:29:15,233 --> 01:29:17,433 to the Ia Drang Valley included

1430

01:29:17,433 --> 01:29:21,666 a newly minted second lieutenant, Lo Khac Tam,

1431

01:29:21,666 --> 01:29:24,833 who had volunteered to fight in the South. LO KHAC TAM: NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY: I had a girl friend, but I din't tell her about it, because it was a secret mission.[34] After we got to the Chu Pong mountains, I realized that to be an officer I would have to learn to command. And the best way to learn would be in battle.

1432

01:29:46,400 --> 01:29:49,366 NARRATOR: IA DRANG VALLEY On the morning of November 14, 1965,

1433

01:29:49,366 --> 01:29:53,600 1st Cavalry helicopters belonging to the 1st Battalion

1434

01:29:53,600 --> 01:29:55,800 of the 7th Regiment--

1435

01:29:55,800 --> 01:29:58,700 George Armstrong Custer's old outfit--

1436

01:29:58,700 --> 01:30:02,433 flew west along the Ia Drang toward the Chu Pong Massif,

1437

01:30:02,433 --> 01:30:04,333 looking for the enemy.

MINUTES 90-100

1438

01:30:06,500 --> 01:30:09,900 Their commander, Kentucky-born Korean-War veteran

1439

01:30:09,900 --> 01:30:12,100 Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore,

1440

01:30:12,100 --> 01:30:14,833 had been told there was a large enemy base camp

1441

01:30:14,833 --> 01:30:16,733 somewhere on its slopes.

1442

01:30:16,733 --> 01:30:20,566 His orders were to take his understrength outfit--

1443

01:30:20,566 --> 01:30:27,233 29 officers and just 411 men-- find the enemy and kill him.

1444

01:30:27,233 --> 01:30:31,300 There were two clearings large enough for Moore to bring in

1445

01:30:31,300 --> 01:30:33,300 eight choppers at once.

1446

01:30:33,300 --> 01:30:38,233 He chose the one closest to the mountain-- Landing Zone X-Ray.

1447

01:30:41,766 --> 01:30:45,266 Moore made a point of leading from the front.

1448

01:30:45,266 --> 01:30:47,966 He was the first man off the first chopper.

1449

01:30:52,500 --> 01:30:56,933 He sent four six-man squads 100 yards in every direction.

1450

01:30:56,933 --> 01:30:59,800 The Ia Drang Valley was so beautiful,

1451

01:30:59,800 --> 01:31:02,000 one soldier remembered,

1452

01:31:02,000 --> 01:31:05,166 it reminded him of a national park back home.

1453

01:31:05,166 --> 01:31:09,500 Within minutes, Moore's men captured a deserter.

1454

01:31:09,500 --> 01:31:11,033 Terrified and trembling,

1455

01:31:11,033 --> 01:31:13,933 he said there were three battalions of soldiers

1456

01:31:13,933 --> 01:31:17,600 on the mountain-- 1,600 men.

1457

01:31:17,600 --> 01:31:20,500 They wanted very much to kill Americans, he said,

1458

01:31:20,500 --> 01:31:24,266 but so far had been unable to find any.

1459

01:31:24,266 --> 01:31:27,300 Moore quickly set up a command post

1460

01:31:27,300 --> 01:31:31,666 behind one of the huge termite mounds that dotted the clearing.

1461

01:31:31,666 --> 01:31:33,933 It would take until mid-afternoon

1462

01:31:33,933 --> 01:31:37,366 for all of his men to be ferried in.

1463

01:31:38,533 --> 01:31:40,533 He had no time to waste.

1464

01:31:40,533 --> 01:31:43,066 "We needed to get off the landing zone

1465

01:31:43,066 --> 01:31:47,266 and get at them before they could hit us," Moore remembered.

1466

01:31:47,266 --> 01:31:51,366 He sent two companies up the slope toward the hidden enemy.

1467

01:31:51,366 --> 01:31:55,100 Most of the North Vietnamese, like the Americans,

1468

01:31:55,100 --> 01:31:56,733 were new to combat.

1469

01:31:58,200 --> 01:32:00,533 They were ordered to fix bayonets.

1470

01:32:02,666 --> 01:32:04,366 LO KHAC TAM: It was a modern battle, but we were told the bayonet symbolized our fighting spirit, attached to the barrels of our rifles.

1471

01:32:15,233 --> 01:32:18,133 NARRATOR: Colonel Moore had no way of knowing

1472

01:32:18,133 --> 01:32:21,666 that instead of 1,600 enemy soldiers on the mountain,

1473

01:32:21,666 --> 01:32:27,400 there were 3,000-- seven times his strength.

1474

01:32:40,200 --> 01:32:41,600 (gunfire)

1475

01:32:41,600 --> 01:32:44,366 Within minutes, the Americans found themselves

1476

01:32:44,366 --> 01:32:48,900 under attack from hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers.

1477

01:32:48,900 --> 01:32:52,500 In the fighting, an overeager second lieutenant

1478

01:32:52,500 --> 01:32:55,600 led his platoon of 28 men too far away

1479

01:32:55,600 --> 01:32:59,100 from the rest of his company and was surrounded.

1480

01:32:59,100 --> 01:33:00,533 (gunfire, shouting)

1481

01:33:01,666 --> 01:33:03,366 The lieutenant was killed.

1482

01:33:03,366 --> 01:33:07,633 The sergeant who took his place was shot through the head.

1483

01:33:07,633 --> 01:33:12,266 By late afternoon, only seven of the trapped platoon's men

1484

01:33:12,266 --> 01:33:15,666 were still capable of firing back.

1485

01:33:15,666 --> 01:33:18,933 (gunfire, shouting)

1486

01:33:24,200 --> 01:33:29,033 Moore was now engaged in three simultaneous struggles--

1487

01:33:29,033 --> 01:33:33,133 to defend the landing zone, attack the North Vietnamese,

1488

01:33:33,133 --> 01:33:37,000 and find a way to rescue his trapped patrol.

1489

01:33:39,933 --> 01:33:44,100 That night, Joe Galloway again managed to talk his way

1490

01:33:44,100 --> 01:33:46,933 onto a chopper taking ammunition and water

1491

01:33:46,933 --> 01:33:48,833 to the besieged Americans.

1492

01:33:48,833 --> 01:33:52,066 As the helicopter approached the battlefield,

1493

01:33:52,066 --> 01:33:54,633 Galloway was sitting on a crate of grenades,

1494

01:33:54,633 --> 01:33:58,000 peering out into the darkness.

1495

01:33:58,000 --> 01:34:03,166 GALLOWAY: And I could see these little pin pricks of light

1496

01:34:03,166 --> 01:34:05,833 coming down the mountain.

1497

01:34:05,833 --> 01:34:10,633 This was the enemy approaching for the next day's attacks.

1498

01:34:12,233 --> 01:34:15,100 We flew in there.

1499

01:34:15,100 --> 01:34:19,366 As they pulled on out, it was dead dark.

1500

01:34:19,366 --> 01:34:22,633 And we're lying there waiting for someone to come tell us

1501

01:34:22,633 --> 01:34:23,900 what to do.

1502

01:34:27,033 --> 01:34:32,000 And the next morning, all of a sudden the bottom fell out.

1503

01:34:34,466 --> 01:34:36,366 (gunfire)

1504

01:34:36,366 --> 01:34:40,333 There was an explosion of fire.

1505

01:34:41,766 --> 01:34:46,366 The noise is horrendous, unimaginable.

1506

01:34:46,366 --> 01:34:49,400 (rapid gunfire, followed by short bursts)

1507

01:34:53,566 --> 01:34:56,433 (gunfire, shouting)

1508

01:34:58,500 --> 01:35:01,433 And in the middle of all of this, you know,

1509

01:35:01,433 --> 01:35:04,300 I-I just flattened out on the ground

1510

01:35:04,300 --> 01:35:08,600 because all that was being fired seemed to be about two,

1511

01:35:08,600 --> 01:35:12,000 two-and-a-half feet off the ground.

1512

01:35:12,000 --> 01:35:16,133 (gunfire, whistling)

1513

01:35:18,900 --> 01:35:21,766 NARRATOR: Hundreds of enemy soldiers hurled themselves

1514

01:35:21,766 --> 01:35:23,066 at the Americans.

1515

01:35:24,566 --> 01:35:28,500 They wore webbed helmets camouflaged with grass,

1516

01:35:28,500 --> 01:35:33,433 and as they came, blowing whistles, screaming,

1517

01:35:33,433 --> 01:35:37,733 they looked like "little trees," one American remembered.

1518

01:35:37,733 --> 01:35:40,466 GALLOWAY: They were trying to overrun us.

1519

01:35:40,466 --> 01:35:42,833 And they came close.

1520

01:35:42,833 --> 01:35:45,033 They came close.

1521

01:35:52,400 --> 01:35:54,700 (gunfire, shouting)

1522

01:36:01,000 --> 01:36:04,366 But we had two things going for us.

1523

01:36:05,700 --> 01:36:09,200 We had a great commander and great soldiers.

1524

01:36:09,200 --> 01:36:15,833 And we had air and artillery support out the yin-yang.

1525

01:36:15,833 --> 01:36:18,500 We had it, and they didn't.

1526

01:36:22,466 --> 01:36:27,300 NARRATOR: But using that air and artillery support could be dangerous.

1527

01:36:27,300 --> 01:36:31,400 Each of Moore's units carefully marked its position with smoke

1528

01:36:31,400 --> 01:36:34,400 to keep from being mistaken for the enemy

1529

01:36:34,400 --> 01:36:36,666 by American airmen overhead.

1530

01:36:39,600 --> 01:36:40,966 LO KHAC TAM: We had to get close. If we didn't, we would be killed right away.

1531

01:36:48,133 --> 01:36:52,266 NARRATOR: Some 18,000 artillery shells would be called in

1532

01:36:52,266 --> 01:36:53,633 over the course of the battle,

1533

01:36:53,633 --> 01:36:58,633 some of them landing just 25 yards from Moore's own men.

1534

01:36:58,633 --> 01:37:04,266 Helicopter gunships fired 3,000 rockets into the enemy.

1535

01:37:04,266 --> 01:37:06,800 The forward air controller

1536

01:37:06,800 --> 01:37:10,433 called for every available aircraft in South Vietnam

1537

01:37:10,433 --> 01:37:12,000 to come and help.

1538

01:37:12,000 --> 01:37:17,566 Warplanes, including B-52 long-range strategic bombers,

1539

01:37:17,566 --> 01:37:21,833 were stacked at 1,000-foot intervals above the battlefield,

1540

01:37:21,833 --> 01:37:25,066 from 7,000 to 35,000 feet,

1541

01:37:25,066 --> 01:37:29,566 impatiently awaiting targets to strafe or bomb or burn.

1542

01:37:31,900 --> 01:37:36,666 "By God," Moore said, "they sent us over here to kill communists

1543

01:37:36,666 --> 01:37:38,166 and that's what we're doing."

1544

01:37:44,266 --> 01:37:45,966 GALLOWAY: I looked up...

1545

01:37:47,833 --> 01:37:55,200 and there were two jets aiming directly at our command post.

1546

01:37:55,200 --> 01:38:01,500 He's dropped two cans of napalm and it's coming toward us,

1547

01:38:01,500 --> 01:38:05,533 loblolly, end over end.

1548

01:38:05,533 --> 01:38:10,333 And these kids, two or three of 'em, plus a sergeant,

1549

01:38:10,333 --> 01:38:14,666 had dug a hole or two over on the edge.

1550

01:38:14,666 --> 01:38:19,600 And I looked as the thing exploded...

1551

01:38:23,733 --> 01:38:28,466 And two of them were dancing in that fire.

1552

01:38:28,466 --> 01:38:32,433 And there's a rush, a roar,

1553

01:38:32,433 --> 01:38:36,600 from the air that's being consumed

1554

01:38:36,600 --> 01:38:42,566 and drawn in as this-this hell come to earth

1555

01:38:42,566 --> 01:38:44,333 is burning there.

1556

01:38:44,333 --> 01:38:49,500 And as that dies back a little, then you can hear the screams.

1557

01:38:51,700 --> 01:38:56,666 And someone yells, "Get this man's feet."

1558

01:38:56,666 --> 01:39:03,733 And I reach down and the boots crumble,

1559

01:39:03,733 --> 01:39:07,933 and the flesh is cooked off of his ankles.

1560

01:39:07,933 --> 01:39:12,133 And I feel those bones in the palms of my hands.

1561

01:39:12,133 --> 01:39:14,833 I can feel it now.

1562

01:39:16,233 --> 01:39:18,933 He died two days later.

1563

01:39:18,933 --> 01:39:23,266 A kid named Jim Nakayama out of Rigby, Idaho.

1564

01:39:38,000 --> 01:39:40,666 NARRATOR: By 10:00 that morning,

1565

01:39:40,666 --> 01:39:44,266 American airpower had beaten back the enemy assault.

1566

01:39:45,633 --> 01:39:47,866 The survivors from the trapped platoon

1567

01:39:47,866 --> 01:39:50,000 were rescued that afternoon.

1568

01:39:50,000 --> 01:39:53,866 They had been pinned to the ground and under fire

1569

01:39:53,866 --> 01:39:56,733 for so long that they had to be coaxed

1570

01:39:56,733 --> 01:39:58,966 into getting to their feet again.

1571

01:40:05,600 --> 01:40:07,733 On the morning of the next day,

1572

01:40:07,733 --> 01:40:11,233 enemy soldiers hurled themselves against the same sector

1573

01:40:11,233 --> 01:40:14,433 of Moore's line four more times

1574

01:40:14,433 --> 01:40:17,833 and were obliterated by artillery and machine gun fire.

1575

01:40:20,033 --> 01:40:22,900 The surviving North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

1576

01:40:22,900 --> 01:40:25,000 withdrew into the forest,

1577

01:40:25,000 --> 01:40:28,033 leaving behind a ghastly ring of their dead

1578

01:40:28,033 --> 01:40:29,933 surrounding the landing zone--

1579

01:40:29,933 --> 01:40:36,266 634 corpses, shot, blasted, blackened by fire.

MINUTES 100-110

1580

01:40:39,833 --> 01:40:43,366 LO KHAC TAM: When I saw my soldiers dying, I felt deep sorrow for them. I didn't cry. I tried to hold back tears. We were shocked psychologically.

1581

01:41:01,933 --> 01:41:04,933 NARRATOR: After three days and two nights of combat,

1582

01:41:04,933 --> 01:41:08,200 helicopters began lifting out the American survivors

1583

01:41:08,200 --> 01:41:11,166 and gathering up the dead.

1584

01:41:11,166 --> 01:41:12,933 SOLDIER: When you look at them,

1585

01:41:12,933 --> 01:41:16,200 it doesn't even resemble a human body.

1586

01:41:16,200 --> 01:41:19,466 It just, it looks just like a mannequin.

1587

01:41:19,466 --> 01:41:22,333 You look at them and say, "That couldn't happen to me."

1588

01:41:25,166 --> 01:41:28,266 SHEEHAN: I saw them fight at Ia Drang.

1589

01:41:28,266 --> 01:41:31,366 It always galls me when I read or hear

1590

01:41:31,366 --> 01:41:33,566 about the World War II generation

1591

01:41:33,566 --> 01:41:35,466 as the greatest generation.

1592

01:41:35,466 --> 01:41:38,500 These kids were just as gallant and as courageous

1593

01:41:38,500 --> 01:41:40,700 as anybody who fought in World War II.

1594

01:41:42,300 --> 01:41:45,200 NARRATOR: Seventy-nine of Hal Moore's men lost their lives

1595

01:41:45,200 --> 01:41:48,733 at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley

1596

01:41:48,733 --> 01:41:54,100 and another 121 were wounded.

1597

01:41:54,100 --> 01:41:57,566 LT COL HAL MOORE: Please convey to the American people

1598

01:41:57,566 --> 01:42:01,866 what a tremendous fighting man we have here.

1599

01:42:01,866 --> 01:42:07,333 He's courageous, he's aggressive, and he's kind.

1600

01:42:07,333 --> 01:42:11,200 And he'll go where you tell him to go.

1601

01:42:11,200 --> 01:42:13,800 And he's got self-discipline.

1602

01:42:13,800 --> 01:42:17,166 And he's got good unit discipline.

1603

01:42:17,166 --> 01:42:19,466 He's just an outstanding man.

1604

01:42:19,466 --> 01:42:20,966 And...

1605

01:42:22,500 --> 01:42:25,466 Having commanded this battalion for 18 months...

1606

01:42:28,233 --> 01:42:30,200 You must excuse my emotion here,

1607

01:42:30,200 --> 01:42:35,733 but when I see some of these men go out the way they have...

1608

01:42:43,400 --> 01:42:45,533 I haven't...

1609

01:42:45,533 --> 01:42:47,933 I can't tell you how highly I feel for them.

1610

01:42:47,933 --> 01:42:50,666 They're tremendous.

1611

01:42:50,666 --> 01:42:53,033 NARRATOR: Hal Moore refused to leave

1612

01:42:53,033 --> 01:42:57,733 until every single man in his command had been accounted for.

1613

01:42:57,733 --> 01:43:03,000 He had been the first of his men to step onto Landing Zone X-Ray,

1614

01:43:03,000 --> 01:43:06,266 and he made sure he was the last to leave it.

1615

01:43:14,300 --> 01:43:19,900 LO KHAC TAM: The war we fought was so horribly brutal that I don't have the words to describe it. I worry, how can we ever explain to the younger generation the price their parents and grandparents paid? [35]

1616

01:43:43,233 --> 01:43:45,933 NARRATOR: The North Vietnamese suffered terrible losses

1617

01:43:45,933 --> 01:43:47,466 in the Ia Drang Valley

1618

01:43:47,466 --> 01:43:51,233 and many of the survivors were traumatized.

1619

01:43:51,233 --> 01:43:54,966 "The units were enveloped in an atmosphere of gloom,"

1620

01:43:54,966 --> 01:43:57,033 a North Vietnamese colonel remembered.

1621

01:43:57,033 --> 01:44:01,500 Some men would not leave their rope hammocks.

1622

01:44:01,500 --> 01:44:03,566 Some refused to wash.

1623

01:44:03,566 --> 01:44:08,866 One soldier wrote a poem expressive of their plight:

1624

01:44:08,866 --> 01:44:11,633 "The crab lies still on the chopping block

1625

01:44:11,633 --> 01:44:15,666 Never knowing when the knife will fall."

1626

01:44:21,400 --> 01:44:27,100 GALLOWAY: In the Ia Drang we killed ten of them for every one of us.

1627

01:44:28,833 --> 01:44:32,966 That's a ten-to-one kill ratio is how the military puts that.

1628

01:44:36,400 --> 01:44:42,800 But the enemy, he was fully prepared to pay that price

1629

01:44:42,800 --> 01:44:47,166 and more for the value of the lessons he learned.

1630

01:44:48,866 --> 01:44:51,166 LO KHAC TAM: To fight the Americans we had to get close, grab them by the belt. If we didn't, we couldn't fight them and we would be killed.

1631

01:45:02,966 --> 01:45:06,100 JOE GALLOWAY: Grab 'em by the belt buckle.

1632

01:45:06,100 --> 01:45:09,566 That means you've got to get so close,

1633

01:45:09,566 --> 01:45:16,200 they can't use the artillery and the aerial bombardments on you

1634

01:45:16,200 --> 01:45:18,733 for fear of killing their own.

1635

01:45:18,733 --> 01:45:23,666 Get in so close that it's man-on-man.

1636

01:45:23,666 --> 01:45:26,733 And then everything is even.

1637

01:45:27,966 --> 01:45:31,566 NEIL SHEEHAN: The Vietnamese suffered hundreds of dead

1638

01:45:31,566 --> 01:45:34,500 attacking Hal Moore's battalion at LZ X-Ray.

1639

01:45:34,500 --> 01:45:40,266 But then they ambushed another battalion a couple of days later

1640

01:45:40,266 --> 01:45:43,566 and wiped it out.

1641

01:45:43,566 --> 01:45:46,233 NARRATOR: In the fighting near Landing Zone Albany,

1642

01:45:46,233 --> 01:45:50,133 the enemy had gotten too close for artillery to be called in.

1643

01:45:51,566 --> 01:45:57,900 Out of some 425 Americans involved, 155 were killed.

1644

01:45:57,900 --> 01:46:02,666 124 more were wounded.

1645

01:46:02,666 --> 01:46:07,600 Both sides claimed victory in the Ia Drang Valley.

1646

01:46:07,600 --> 01:46:10,433 The Americans talked up the number of enemy dead

1647

01:46:10,433 --> 01:46:12,133 at Landing Zone X-Ray.

1648

01:46:12,133 --> 01:46:14,266 BG RICHARD K KNOWLES: ASS'T COMMANDER 1ST CAV DIV The ratio of losses to your kill...

1649

01:46:15,766 --> 01:46:17,933 NARRATOR: The North Vietnamese took their lessons

1650

01:46:17,933 --> 01:46:20,066 from Landing Zone Albany.

1651

01:46:27,300 --> 01:46:29,766 WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: I don't anticipate

1652

01:46:29,766 --> 01:46:35,266 that this conflict will end any time soon,

1653

01:46:35,266 --> 01:46:39,933 and we could find that we have more difficult days ahead.

1654

01:46:39,933 --> 01:46:42,666 Certainly we must be prepared for this.

1655

01:46:50,433 --> 01:46:55,366 EHRHART: In the fall of my senior year, November 1965,

1656

01:46:55,366 --> 01:46:58,800 was that huge battle at the Ia Drang Valley,

1657

01:46:58,800 --> 01:47:01,866 which was the first time there was actually confirmed

1658

01:47:01,866 --> 01:47:04,366 North Vietnamese regular soldiers as opposed

1659

01:47:04,366 --> 01:47:06,100 to Viet Cong.

1660

01:47:06,100 --> 01:47:09,100 And of course my way of interpreting that was,

1661

01:47:09,100 --> 01:47:10,700 "There it is, that's the proof.

1662

01:47:10,700 --> 01:47:12,700 The North Vietnamese are the aggressors here."

1663

01:47:12,700 --> 01:47:17,233 And that's when I began thinking in terms of

1664

01:47:17,233 --> 01:47:19,733 maybe I don't want to go to college right away.

1665

01:47:19,733 --> 01:47:23,033 Maybe I'll join the Marines.

1666

01:47:23,033 --> 01:47:24,233 And it was always the Marines.

1667

01:47:24,233 --> 01:47:26,066 I never... there was no question.

1668

01:47:26,066 --> 01:47:27,733 The Marine Corps is full of little guys like me

1669

01:47:27,733 --> 01:47:29,066 with chips on our shoulder.

1670

01:47:29,066 --> 01:47:30,600 ("Eve of Destruction by Barry McGuire plays)

1671

01:47:30,600 --> 01:47:33,033 McGUIRE: ♪ The eastern world, it is explodin'. ♪

1672

01:47:33,033 --> 01:47:36,033 NARRATOR: The battles in the Ia Drang Valley may have been declared

1673

01:47:36,033 --> 01:47:40,300 American victories, but privately, General Westmoreland

1674

01:47:40,300 --> 01:47:43,500 and the Johnson administration were worried.

1675

01:47:43,500 --> 01:47:47,100 In spite of the Americans' new airborne mobility,

1676

01:47:47,100 --> 01:47:49,633 the enemy had been able to choose

1677

01:47:49,633 --> 01:47:52,433 the place and time of battle.

1678

01:47:52,433 --> 01:47:56,033 The intelligence on which basic decisions had been made

1679

01:47:56,033 --> 01:48:00,500 in Washington had been uniformly bad.

1680

01:48:00,500 --> 01:48:03,700 There were now believed to be 12 Viet Cong regiments

1681

01:48:03,700 --> 01:48:06,533 in South Vietnam, not just five;

1682

01:48:06,533 --> 01:48:09,900 nine North Vietnamese regiments, not three.

1683

01:48:11,100 --> 01:48:13,000 Despite months of bombing,

1684

01:48:13,000 --> 01:48:15,833 three times as many North Vietnamese regulars

1685

01:48:15,833 --> 01:48:19,466 were now slipping south of the demilitarized zone

1686

01:48:19,466 --> 01:48:21,900 as originally believed.

1687

01:48:21,900 --> 01:48:26,200 Hanoi seemed to be escalating, too.

1688

01:48:26,200 --> 01:48:30,500 And American casualties were climbing.

1689

01:48:30,500 --> 01:48:33,766 When Senator Fritz Hollings visited Saigon

1690

01:48:33,766 --> 01:48:36,300 shortly after the Ia Drang battles,

1691

01:48:36,300 --> 01:48:40,066 General Westmoreland told him, "We're killing these people

1692

01:48:40,066 --> 01:48:42,333 at a rate of ten to one."

1693

01:48:42,333 --> 01:48:43,766 Hollings warned him,

1694

01:48:43,766 --> 01:48:47,433 "Westy, the American people don't care about the ten.

1695

01:48:47,433 --> 01:48:49,500 They care about the one."

1696

01:48:51,400 --> 01:48:54,233 Westmoreland, who had said he could win the war

1697

01:48:54,233 --> 01:48:58,300 in three years, now sent an urgent cable to Washington

1698

01:48:58,300 --> 01:49:01,333 asking for 200,000 more troops.

1699

01:49:01,333 --> 01:49:03,466 McGUIRE: ♪ Yeah, my blood's so mad...

1700

01:49:03,466 --> 01:49:06,133 NARRATOR: "The message came as a shattering blow,"

1701

01:49:06,133 --> 01:49:08,366 Robert McNamara remembered.

1702

01:49:08,366 --> 01:49:13,466 Once again, he offered Johnson two options:

1703

01:49:13,466 --> 01:49:16,766 try to negotiate[36] a compromise with Hanoi,

1704

01:49:16,766 --> 01:49:20,466 or accede to Westmoreland's request for more men,

1705

01:49:20,466 --> 01:49:23,833 though the chances of victory, the secretary of defense said,

1706

01:49:23,833 --> 01:49:28,033 might be no better than one in three.

1707

01:49:28,033 --> 01:49:30,833 GALLOWAY: And then they all sat down

1708

01:49:30,833 --> 01:49:33,800 and voted for option two.

1709

01:49:33,800 --> 01:49:35,833 McGUIRE: ♪ Over and over and over...

1710

01:49:35,833 --> 01:49:40,033 KARL MARLANTES: MARINES My bitterness about the political powers at the time

1711

01:49:40,033 --> 01:49:44,966 was, first of all, the lying.

1712

01:49:44,966 --> 01:49:48,433 I mean, I can understand a policy error

1713

01:49:48,433 --> 01:49:51,133 that is incredibly, incredibly painful

1714

01:49:51,133 --> 01:49:53,200 and kills a lot of people out of a mistake

1715

01:49:53,200 --> 01:49:56,400 if they made that with noble hearts.

1716

01:49:56,400 --> 01:49:58,866 That was, you know, when Eisenhower and Kennedy

1717

01:49:58,866 --> 01:50:01,533 were trying to figure things out.

1718

01:50:01,533 --> 01:50:05,866 And you read that, you know, McNamara knew by '65--

1719

01:50:05,866 --> 01:50:07,766 it was just three years before I was there--

1720

01:50:07,766 --> 01:50:09,100 that the war was unwinnable.[37]

1721

01:50:09,100 --> 01:50:11,033 That's what makes me mad.

1722

01:50:11,033 --> 01:50:13,333 Making a mistake, people can do that.

1723

01:50:13,333 --> 01:50:15,100 But covering up mistakes,

1724

01:50:15,100 --> 01:50:19,366 then you're killing people for your own ego.

1725

01:50:19,366 --> 01:50:22,533 And that makes me mad.

MINUTES 110-END

1726

01:50:24,666 --> 01:50:26,266 NARRATOR: Tens of thousands of American troops

1727

01:50:26,266 --> 01:50:30,233 continued to prepare to deploy to Vietnam

1728

01:50:30,233 --> 01:50:31,433 from all over the country,

1729

01:50:31,433 --> 01:50:34,966 and General Westmoreland and his commanders

1730

01:50:34,966 --> 01:50:37,166 drew up plans for major offensives

1731

01:50:37,166 --> 01:50:40,266 in the new year of 1966.

1732

01:50:44,100 --> 01:50:47,700 Meanwhile, hoping the Soviets might help bring Hanoi

1733

01:50:47,700 --> 01:50:51,666 to the bargaining table, McNamara urged the President

1734

01:50:51,666 --> 01:50:55,933 to declare a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam.

1735

01:50:55,933 --> 01:50:58,566 Over the objections of the military,

1736

01:50:58,566 --> 01:51:01,400 who worried it would give the enemy time to rebuild

1737

01:51:01,400 --> 01:51:05,766 its defenses, Johnson agreed to stop the bombing

1738

01:51:05,766 --> 01:51:08,600 on Christmas Eve.

1739

01:51:08,600 --> 01:51:10,833 If it achieved nothing else, he said,

1740

01:51:10,833 --> 01:51:13,133 it would show the American people

1741

01:51:13,133 --> 01:51:16,566 that before he committed more of their sons to battle,

1742

01:51:16,566 --> 01:51:19,733 "We have gone the last mile."

1743

01:51:19,733 --> 01:51:23,000 ("Little Drummer Boy" by Burl Ives playing)

1744

01:51:23,000 --> 01:51:28,566 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Well, Christmas always meant a great deal in our family.

1745

01:51:28,566 --> 01:51:33,066 We sent packages to Denton, of course.

1746

01:51:33,066 --> 01:51:35,233 Then a neighbor mentioned to me

1747

01:51:35,233 --> 01:51:39,766 that she heard a local television station was offering

1748

01:51:39,766 --> 01:51:43,666 free tapes to be made to send to a soldier overseas.

1749

01:51:43,666 --> 01:51:48,433 CAROL CROCKER: We dressed up for the cameras.

1750

01:51:48,433 --> 01:51:51,300 The idea was that we would each just say something

1751

01:51:51,300 --> 01:51:54,466 about what we were doing and wish him well.

1752

01:51:56,633 --> 01:51:59,233 It was a horrible day for me.

1753

01:51:59,233 --> 01:52:04,333 It made it so real that he was far away.

1754

01:52:04,333 --> 01:52:07,700 MR. CROCHER: Well, Mogie, here we are.

1755

01:52:07,700 --> 01:52:11,500 It's... let's see what day is today.

1756

01:52:11,500 --> 01:52:12,800 Here it is, Saturday...

1757

01:52:12,800 --> 01:52:13,866 November 13.

1758

01:52:13,866 --> 01:52:16,066 November 13,

1759

01:52:16,066 --> 01:52:21,233 and station WTEN has given us a chance to talk to you.

1760

01:52:21,233 --> 01:52:23,800 We all wish you a Merry Christmas

1761

01:52:23,800 --> 01:52:25,033 to start out with.

1762

01:52:26,466 --> 01:52:28,966 Rand, what do you got to say to Mogie?

1763

01:52:28,966 --> 01:52:30,333 RAND CROCKER: Merry Christmas.

1764

01:52:30,333 --> 01:52:31,366 Merry Christmas.

1765

01:52:33,266 --> 01:52:34,600 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: Merry Christmas, darling.

1766

01:52:34,600 --> 01:52:35,966 We sent your packages

1767

01:52:35,966 --> 01:52:37,833 and there's one that's waiting for you at home.

1768

01:52:37,833 --> 01:52:39,533 It's a record of fife and drum music

1769

01:52:39,533 --> 01:52:42,166 that we got for you at Williamsburg.

1770

01:52:42,166 --> 01:52:43,166 Candy?

1771

01:52:44,966 --> 01:52:50,800 CANDY CROCKER: My teacher isn't very nice, and she always is crabby,

1772

01:52:50,800 --> 01:52:53,300 and I don't like school at all.

1773

01:52:53,300 --> 01:52:55,333 Now I'm a brownie.

1774

01:52:55,333 --> 01:52:56,900 Merry Christmas.

1775

01:52:58,433 --> 01:52:59,800 CAROL CROCKER: Happy Christmas, Mogie.

1776

01:52:59,800 --> 01:53:01,733 I think I'm getting new skis for Christmas.

1777

01:53:01,733 --> 01:53:03,866 So when you get home, we can get together sometime.

1778

01:53:03,866 --> 01:53:07,433 MR. CROCKER: We do all wish you a very Merry Christmas,

1779

01:53:07,433 --> 01:53:09,633 and we'll be thinking of you on Christmas Day.

1780

01:53:12,533 --> 01:53:14,233 JEAN-MARIE CROCKER: We miss you, sweetheart.

1781

01:53:16,333 --> 01:53:20,400 IVES: ♪ Me and my drum.

1782

01:53:25,700 --> 01:53:27,933 ("Turn! Turn! Turn!" by the Byrds playing)

1783

01:53:39,833 --> 01:53:44,500 ♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

1784

01:53:44,500 --> 01:53:49,266 ♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

1785

01:53:49,266 --> 01:53:55,266 ♪ And a time to every purpose under heaven ♪

1786

01:53:57,100 --> 01:54:02,100 ♪ A time to be born, a time to die ♪

1787

01:54:02,100 --> 01:54:04,700 ♪ A time to plant, a time to reap ♪

1788

01:54:04,700 --> 01:54:08,566 ♪ A time to kill, a time to heal ♪

1789

01:54:08,566 --> 01:54:16,000 ♪ A time to laugh, a time to weep ♪

1790

01:54:16,000 --> 01:54:21,300 ♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

1791

01:54:21,300 --> 01:54:26,566 ♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

1792

01:54:26,566 --> 01:54:32,166 ♪ And a time to every purpose under heaven ♪

1793

01:54:33,966 --> 01:54:37,800 ♪ A time to build up, a time to break down ♪

1794

01:54:37,800 --> 01:54:42,366 ♪ A time to dance, a time to mourn ♪

1795

01:54:42,366 --> 01:54:45,833 ♪ A time to cast away stones

1796

01:54:45,833 --> 01:54:51,666 ♪ A time to gather stones together ♪

1797

01:54:53,400 --> 01:54:58,700 ♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

1798

01:54:58,700 --> 01:55:03,966 ♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

1799

01:55:03,966 --> 01:55:09,466 ♪ And a time to every purpose under heaven ♪

1800

01:55:11,500 --> 01:55:15,200 ♪ A time of love, a time of hate ♪

1801

01:55:15,200 --> 01:55:20,433 ♪ A time of war, a time of peace ♪

1802

01:55:20,433 --> 01:55:23,233 ♪ A time you may embrace

1803

01:55:23,233 --> 01:55:29,533 ♪ A time to refrain from embracing ♪

1804

01:55:31,066 --> 01:55:35,933 ♪ To everything, turn, turn, turn ♪

1805

01:55:35,933 --> 01:55:41,033 ♪ There is a season, turn, turn, turn ♪

1806

01:55:41,033 --> 01:55:46,933 ♪ And a time to every purpose under heaven ♪

1807

01:55:49,133 --> 01:55:52,733 ♪ A time to gain, a time to lose ♪

1808

01:55:52,733 --> 01:55:56,733 ♪ A time to rend, a time to sew ♪

1809

01:55:56,733 --> 01:56:00,766 ♪ A time for love, a time for hate ♪

1810

01:56:00,766 --> 01:56:07,100 ♪ A time for peace, I swear it's not too late. ♪

1811

01:56:10,000 --> 01:56:12,066 Captioned by Media Access Group at WGBH, access.wgbh.org

1812

01:56:17,366 --> 01:56:18,566 ANNOUNCER: LEARN MORE ABOUT THE FILM

1813

01:56:18,566 --> 01:56:21,433 AND FIND ADDITIONAL RESOURCES AT PBS.ORG/VIETNAMWAR

1814

01:56:21,433 --> 01:56:25,366 AND JOIN THE CONVERSATION USING HASHTAG VIETNAMWARPBS.

1815

01:56:25,366 --> 01:56:26,833 "THE VIETNAM WAR" IS AVAILABLE

1816

01:56:26,833 --> 01:56:28,500 ON BLU-RAY AND DVD.

1817

01:56:28,500 --> 01:56:30,166 THE COMPANION BOOK, SOUNDTRACK,

1818

01:56:30,166 --> 01:56:31,566 AND ORIGINAL SCORE FROM THE FILM

1819

01:56:31,566 --> 01:56:32,700 ARE ALSO AVAILABLE.

1820

01:56:32,700 --> 01:56:34,800 TO ORDER, VISIT SHOPPBS.ORG

1821

01:56:34,800 --> 01:56:37,266 OR CALL 1-800-PLAY-PBS.

1822

01:56:37,266 --> 01:56:38,700 EPISODES OF THIS SERIES ALSO

1823

01:56:38,700 --> 01:56:39,800 AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD

1824

01:56:39,800 --> 01:56:40,900 FROM iTUNES.

1825

01:56:44,166 --> 01:56:46,300 ANNOUNCER: BANK OF AMERICA PROUDLY SUPPORTS

1826

01:56:46,300 --> 01:56:51,200 KEN BURNS' AND LYNN NOVICK'S FILM "THE VIETNAM WAR"

1827

01:56:51,200 --> 01:56:53,600 BECAUSE FOSTERING DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

1828

01:56:53,600 --> 01:56:56,200 AND CIVIL DISCOURSE AROUND IMPORTANT ISSUES

1829

01:56:56,200 --> 01:56:58,500 FURTHERS PROGRESS, EQUALITY,

1830

01:56:58,500 --> 01:57:00,566 AND A MORE CONNECTED SOCIETY.

1831

01:57:05,033 --> 01:57:09,066 GO TO BANKOFAMERICA.COM/ BETTERCONNECTED TO LEARN MORE.

1832

01:57:12,533 --> 01:57:13,966 ANNOUNCER: MAJOR SUPPORT FOR "THE VIETNAM WAR"

1833

01:57:13,966 --> 01:57:17,466 WAS PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF THE BETTER ANGELS SOCIETY,

1834

01:57:17,466 --> 01:57:21,433 INCLUDING JONATHAN AND JEANNIE LAVINE,

1835

01:57:21,433 --> 01:57:24,333 DIANE AND HAL BRIERLEY,

1836

01:57:24,333 --> 01:57:26,733 AMY AND DAVID ABRAMS,

1837

01:57:26,733 --> 01:57:29,233 JOHN AND CATHERINE DEBS,

1838

01:57:29,233 --> 01:57:32,133 THE FULLERTON FAMILY CHARITABLE FUND,

1839

01:57:32,133 --> 01:57:34,200 THE MONTRONE FAMILY,

1840

01:57:34,200 --> 01:57:36,533 LYNDA AND STEWART RESNICK,

1841

01:57:36,533 --> 01:57:39,300 THE PERRY AND DONNA GOLKIN FAMILY FOUNDATION,

1842

01:57:39,300 --> 01:57:40,300 THE LYNCH FOUNDATION,

1843

01:57:40,300 --> 01:57:43,166 THE ROGER AND ROSEMARY ENRICO FOUNDATION,

1844

01:57:43,166 --> 01:57:46,600 AND BY THESE ADDITIONAL FUNDERS.

1845

01:57:46,600 --> 01:57:48,500 MAJOR FUNDING WAS ALSO PROVIDED

1846

01:57:48,500 --> 01:57:50,233 BY DAVID H. KOCH...

1847

01:57:52,533 --> 01:57:54,733 THE BLAVATNIK FAMILY FOUNDATION...

1848

01:57:57,066 --> 01:57:59,500 THE PARK FOUNDATION,

1849

01:57:59,500 --> 01:58:01,733 THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES,

1850

01:58:01,733 --> 01:58:03,933 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,

1851

01:58:03,933 --> 01:58:06,600 THE JOHN S. AND JAMES L. KNIGHT FOUNDATION,

1852

01:58:06,600 --> 01:58:09,366 THE ANDREW W. MELLON FOUNDATION,

1853

01:58:09,366 --> 01:58:11,966 THE ARTHUR VINING DAVIS FOUNDATIONS,

1854

01:58:11,966 --> 01:58:14,166 THE FORD FOUNDATION JUSTFILMS,

1855

01:58:14,166 --> 01:58:15,366 BY THE CORPORATION

1856

01:58:15,366 --> 01:58:16,600 FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING,

1857

01:58:16,600 --> 01:58:18,566 AND BY VIEWERS LIKE YOU.

1858

01:58:18,566 --> 01:58:19,700 THANK YOU.

References

  1. [from?]
  2. see Shaw on Khanh vs. Thich Tri Quang
  3. by the Communists
  4. There seems to be a concerted effort to scapegoat Le Duan for the sins of Ho Chi Minh
  5. The Ninth Plenum began the movement of PAVN battalion-sized units to SVN
  6. see note
  7. Johnson notoriously disrespected military advice from the JCS, see below captions 300-309
  8. in an ostensibly neutral country
  9. retaliatory
  10. OPLAN 34A
  11. see captions 256-266
  12. If the North considered the SVN to be a part of NVN, why should NVN be off limits to retaliation?
  13. North Vietnamese regular army units had been arriving in South Vietnam since 1963 and were notably present at the battle for Nam Dong on July 4, 1964, the previous month.
  14. since May 1959
  15. Also known to the Americans as the Averill Harriman Memorial Highway.
  16. The communists plowed under the ARVN cemetary
  17. Where are the heart wrenching stories of South Vietnamese whose families were disembowled by the VC in front of them and their village.
  18. The Seaborne Ho Chi Minh Trail
  19. see Negotiations
  20. meaning only U.S.
  21. see essay Negotiations
  22. What is this source?
  23. McNaughton, John. "Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)". Foreign Relations of the United States. Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department. Retrieved 10 October 2017. 
  24. "A Paper Tiger" in Mao's terms.
  25. I think he means the Rubicon
  26. He didn't graduate from High School with 3 months to go?
  27. for hours?
  28. in Vietnamese?
  29. This is gratuitously added text by the authors.
  30. see 1969 article
  31. see essay on Safer
  32. translate?
  33. This video was weird, even for me
  34. So Governments make secret decisions!
  35. To bring them to Communism.
  36. see Negotiations
  37. see Colby Speech 1996

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